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Summary
This thesis presents the Guided System Development (GSD) framework, which
aims at supporting the development of secure communication systems.
A communication system is specied in a language similar to the Alice and Bob
notation, a simple and intuitive language used to describe the global perspective
of the communications between dierent principals. The notation used in the
GSD framework extends that notation with constructs that allow the security
requirements of the messages to be described.
From that specication, the developer is guided through a semi-automatic trans-
lation that enables the verication and implementation of the system. The trans-
lation is semi-automatic because the developer has the option of choosing which
implementation to use in order to achieve the specied security requirements.
The implementation options are given by plugins dened in the framework. The
framework's exibility allows for the addition of constructs that model new se-
curity properties as well as new plugins that implement the security properties.
In order to provide higher security assurances, the system specication can be
veried by formal methods tools such as the Beliefs and Knowledge (BAK)
tool  developed specically for the GSD framework , LySatool and OFMC.
The framework's exibility and the existence of the system model in dierent
perspectives  an overall global perspective and an endpoint perspective 
allow the connection to new formal methods tools.
ii
The modeled system is also translated into code that implements the commu-
nication skeleton of the system and can then be used by the system designer.
New output languages can also easily be added to the GSD framework.
Additionally, a prototype of the GSD framework was implemented and an ex-
ample of using the GSD framework in a real world system is presented.
Resumé
Denne afhandling præsenterer softwareplatformen Guided System Development
(GSD), der har til formål at understøtte udviklingen af sikre kommunikations-
systemer.
Et kommunikationssystem er speciceret i et sprog der minder om Alice og
Bob notationen; et simpelt og intuitivt sprog der beskriver det globale syn på
kommunikation mellem forskellige aktører. Notationen brugt på GSD platformen
udvider denne notation med begreber der tillader at sikkerhedskrav kan knyttes
til udvekslede beskeder.
Ud fra denne specikation bliver udvikleren ført gennem en delvis automatisk
oversættelse, der muliggør vericering og implementering af systemet. Over-
sættelsen er delvis, fordi udvikleren har mulighed for at vælge hvilken imple-
mentation der skal bruges for at opnå de ønskede sikkerhedskrav. Implemen-
tationsmulighederne er givet ved moduler deneret til platformen. Platformens
eksibilitet tillader at der bliver tilføjet yderligere begreber der modellerer nye
sikkerhedsegenskaber samt nye moduler der implementerer disse egenskaber.
For at kunne give stærkere sikkerhedsgarantier kan specikationen blive veri-
ceret af forskellige værktøjer inden for formelle metoder, så som Beliefs and
Knowledge (BAK)  udviklet specielt til GSD platformen , LySatool og
OFMC. Platformens eksibilitet  og det at systemet kan modelleres både fra
et globalt synspunkt og et endepunkts-synspunkt  tillader at platformen også
kan bruges med nye værktøjer.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
If you reveal your secrets to the wind, you should
not blame the wind for revealing them to the trees.
Kahlil Gibran
Presently, the need for security in the Internet and other communication systems
is ever-increasing and, therefore, it is extremely important to provide tools that
help system developers to specify communication systems, to choose possible
security implementations, to verify the security properties of those systems, and
to generate code that implements the system's functionality.
Formal methods provide powerful tools that can be used to verify the secu-
rity properties of communication systems. However, these tools are not always
integrated with the used development environment. This shortcoming is ag-
gravated by the necessary expertise to use formal methods and interpret their
results. This obstacle can be overcome by using a framework that aids and
guides the developer on the specication of the system under development, on
choosing the appropriate implementations that achieve the required security
properties, on allowing the automatic verication of its security properties, and
also on providing an implementation of the specied system.
2 Introduction
That is closely related with the main thesis of my research and, therefore, of
the work presented here, which can be summarized as follows:
Security is crucial in communication systems, thus it is important to aid sys-
tem designers on the implementation of secure communication systems. This
work presents a framework that, with the use of step-wise renement and formal
methods, helps a system designer achieving the desired system security without
requiring the knowledge to work directly with formal methods tools.
A brief overview of the aforementioned framework, the Guided System Devel-
opment framework (GSD) is given in Section 1.3.
1.1 Background
In this section, a brief overview of the state-of-the-art of the topics covered in
this work is given. A more thorough review is presented in Section 2.
Even though the Service-Oriented Systems (SOS) paradigm is not directly tar-
geted in this work, it has been widely used and researched and, therefore, is
worth studying. Service-Oriented Systems are composed by several indepen-
dent units (principals) that communicate between themselves by exchanging
messages. A signicant amount of work has been done on formalizing frame-
works that have a similar aim to the GSD framework, namely the modeling of
SOS and verication of its security properties. One such framework is CaPiTo,
presented in Section 2.1.1. Another project with similar goals is AVANTSSAR
(Section 2.1.2). More extensive work has been done on the formalization
and development of languages that allow the specication and the reasoning
of Service-Oriented Systems. In Section 2.3.1, KLAIM, a process calculus to
model Service-Oriented Systems, is introduced. Another language targeted at
SOS is CaSPiS, presented in Section 2.3.3. Also worth mentioning, specially for
the inuence that the Alice and Bob notation had in the work presented here,
is the AnB language, which is presented in Section 2.3.2.
Security standard suites are generally used in the development of secure com-
munication systems. In the GSD framework, they are used as plugins to im-
plement the dierent desired security properties. These suites are, for example,
WS-Security for SOAP web services, TLS/SSL, or IPSEC. These standards are
presented in more detail in Section 5.1.1.
Another important area of research for this work is the use of formal methods.
More specically, the methods and tools targeted at verifying security proper-
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ties of communication protocols. LySatool is presented in Section 2.5.1, the
Open-source Fixed-point Model Checker (OFMC) is presented in Section 2.5.2,
and ProVerif is presented in Section 2.5.3. Furthermore, the Beliefs and Knowl-
edge (BAK) tool, which was developed specically for the GSD framework is
introduced in Section 3.
Channel Abstraction, which heavily inuenced the GSD framework's security
modules, is presented in Section 2.4. Belief Logics play a great role both on
the BAK tool and on dening the semantics of the security modules and are,
therefore, presented in Section 2.6. SAT and SMT, which are used by the BAK
tool, are presented in Section 2.7.
Finally, being able to generate code from the system specication is essential
to provide the developer with the code that implements the modeled system.
Code generation is introduced in Section 2.8.
1.2 Requirements Analysis
By performing a requirements analysis, the following properties were found to
be needed in the framework under development:
 Simple Modeling Language
 The framework must be able to model simple communication systems with
security assurances regarding the exchanged messages
 Modeling of the security requirements must be separate from their imple-
mentation
 Results from dierent formal methods tools must be provided
 No specic formal tools knowledge required
 The code skeleton for the communication system must be automatically
generated
The GSD Framework, introduced in the Section bellow, was developed having
in consideration these requirements.
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1.3 The GSD Framework
Part of the GSD framework is strongly inspired by CaPiTo [GNN09] and its
main contribution: the successful connection of the abstract specication of
communication systems  in CaPiTo's case, Service-Oriented Systems  with
the usage of industry standard suites with the verication of the protocol and
generation of code. CaPiTo uses LySatool [Buc05] to perform the verication of
the system and generates system implementations in the programming language
C.
One of the goals of the GSD framework is to apply CaPiTo's main contribu-
tion  the separation of concerns regarding the modeling of communication
protocols  in a simple and intuitive way. This separation of concerns is an es-
sential part of the GSD framework, which enables the specication, verication,
and implementation of communication systems by having dierent levels of ab-
straction, step-wise renement between them and using a simple and intuitive
modeling language similar to the Alice and Bob Notation.
The overall structure of the GSD framework is shown in Figure 1.1. The frame-
work is composed by three levels that represent dierent system perspectives
and abstractions:
 The Abstract Global level (Chapter 4) is the most abstract level. It is the
level where a system designer species the communication system. This
specication allows the use of security modules, which are presented in
detail in Section 4.2, to specify the required security assurances for the
data being exchanged in the modeled system;
 A specication of a system in the Concrete Global level (Chapter 5) is
the result of automatically translating the Abstract Global level speci-
cation by unfolding the security modules using plugins. Plugins connect
the security modules of the Abstract Global level with the implementa-
tions of those modules. For instance, if there is a security module in the
Abstract Global level specication that requires some data to be sent in a
condential way, this translation could replace it with an implementation
of, for example, TLS. The use of plugins, which as mentioned is inspired
by CaPiTo [GNN09], allows for an important separation of concerns when
modeling a communication system: the separation between the desired se-
curity assurances of the exchanged data and the implementation of those
assurances. In Section 5.1, the use of plugins and the exibility that they
provide is discussed;
 A specication at the Concrete Global level is made more concrete by
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performing an endpoint projection, resulting in the Concrete Endpoint
level (Chapter 6). This step separates the specications into each prin-
cipal's perspective, resulting in a specication that is closer to the nal
implementation and to some languages used by the supported verication
tools.
Abstract Global
Concrete Global
Concrete Endpoint
of security
endpoint projection
code
verification
tools
unfolding
modules
Figure 1.1: Overview of the Guided System Development framework.
Another component of the Abstract Global level is contracts. Contracts repre-
sent the desired outcomes of the security modules used in the Abstract Global
level. For example, part of the contract that is attached to the condentiality
module is that only the intended recipient of that data is able to see data sent
condentially, i.e., no one else is able to see the plain-text data being exchanged.
Contracts allow not only for some preliminary reasoning in the Abstract Global
level (discussed in Section 4.3), but also the verication of plugins by verifying
the desired outcomes described in the contracts with the outcomes achieved by
the dierent implementations given by the plugins. This is explained in more
detail in Section 4.2.3.
The designer is able to choose which implementation of the security modules
to use and also perform formal verication of the system after the plugins are
automatically replaced by their implementation. Alternatively, the designer
has the option of directly modeling the system in the Concrete Global level or
Concrete Endpoint level languages, although this will limit the advantages of
specifying the system at the Abstract Global level and the amount of formal
verication that can be performed. This option could, however, be useful for
more experienced system developers or for already implemented systems, in
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which case a specication closer to the implementation might be easier to write.
In fact, the latter happened in the use case presented in Chapter 8.
Another advantage of this framework is that it allows a protocol designer to
specify and test new protocols and provide them as plugins to the system de-
signer. The protocol designer can model a new protocol in the Concrete Global
or Concrete Endpoint levels and use the framework to verify its security prop-
erties. If found to be secure, the protocol can then be made available to the
system designer by dening it as a plugin.
1.3.1 Framework Inputs and Outputs
The modeling language used in GSD is strongly inuenced by Alice and Bob
notation, a simple and intuitive way of modeling communication systems. The
example in Listing 1.1 uses this notation to model a message msg being sent by
a principal called Alice to another principal called Bob.
Al i c e ! Bob : msg
Listing 1.1: Example of sending an (non encrypted) message from User to
Board in Alice and Bob notation.
As previously mentioned, when building a system with secure communications
using GSD, the input for the framework is the specication of the system in
the Abstract Global level, which includes security assurances for the exchanged
messages. Specifying a communication system at this level together with the
step-wise renement will lead to an implementation that provides the specied
security assurances.
The outputs of GSD can be divided into two categories: the information from
the supported verication tools and the implementation of the modeled system.
These are presented in more detail throughout the dierent Chapters.
1.4 The Message Board
To illustrate the use of the GSD framework, the communication behind a mes-
sage board is used as an example throughout the thesis to better illustrate the
dierent components of the GSD framework.
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The message board allows a user to share a message in an authentic way or
not and he might choose to share that message with the entire board or with a
specic user, i.e., condentiality. The combination of these properties gives rise
to four dierent kinds of messages:
1. The message sent can be seen by everybody without any guarantees re-
garding the identity of the sender,
2. The message sent can be seen by everybody and it has guarantees regard-
ing the identity of the sender,
3. The message sent can only be seen by a particular user without guarantees
regarding the identity of the sender, or
4. The message sent can only be seen by a particular user and it has guar-
antees regarding the identity of the sender.
Throughout the presentation of the GSD framework, a small example of this
system will be used where there are three principals (Alice, Bob, and Carsten)
who send a message each to the message board (MB). Alice sends a message as
described above in 2, Bob sends a message of type 3, and nally Carsten sends
a message of type 4.
1.5 Thesis Contribution
The main contribution of my PhD thesis is the Guided System Development
(GSD) framework, which was briey introduced in Section 1.3 and is described in
more detail in the remainder of this thesis. The GSD framework has a clear focus
on security from the start of the modeling process and it provides automatic
translations to languages used by dierent protocol veriers using the same
system model. These protocols veriers enable checking the system specication
against a variety of security properties and having access to dierent veriers,
each with its own strengths, allows for a broader range of analyses results. A
prototype implementation was developed and is presented in Chapter 7. This
prototype provides a proof of concept of the ideas and contributions of this
thesis and it was designed with exibility and extensibility in mind in order to
enable the easy implementation of future extensions.
Another important contribution of this work is the Beliefs and Knowledge
(BAK) tool, presented in Chapter 3. This tool extends BAN logic [BAN90]
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with an explicit Dolev-Yao attacker model [DY83] and uses Z3 [DMB08], a Sat-
isability Modulo Theory (SMT) solver, to reason about the security properties
of a modeled protocol. Due to the way the attacker is implemented in the
BAK tool, it allows for the modeling of dierent attack scenarios and attacker
capabilities in a modular fashion.
1.6 Document Structure
Firstly, an overview of relevant previous work is given in Chapter 2. After that,
a presentation of the Belief and Knowledge tool is given in Chapter 3 followed by
the presentation of the framework, which consists on the Abstract Global level
(Chapter 4, the Concrete Global level (Chapter 5, and the Concrete Endpoint
level (Chapter 6). In Chapter 7, details about the prototype implementation of
the Guided System Development framework are given, and in Chapter 8 a use
case of the framework is presented. Finally, a conclusion is given in Chapter 9
and future work is discussed.
Chapter 2
Previous Work
In this chapter, an overview of related work is given. That includes previous
work on frameworks for communication systems (Section 2.1) as well as previ-
ous works on tools that provide formally proven specications and their imple-
mentation (Sectio 2.2). Abstraction Languages used to model Service-Oriented
Systems are presented in Section 2.3. Channel Abstraction, which heavily in-
uenced the GSD framework's Security Modules, are presented in Section 2.4
and work done on Protocol Verication Tools is reviewed in Section 2.5. After
that, Belief Logics (Section 2.6) and SAT/SMT (Section 2.7) are presented. And
nally, some techniques for code generation are also discussed, in Section 2.8.
2.1 Secure Communications Frameworks
The GSD framework is not directly targeting Service-Oriented Systems, but the
signicant amount of work that has been done in the last years in this area
makes it important to review. For that reason, dierent frameworks that target
Service-Oriented Systems are presented in these section, together with other
frameworks that are targeted more at general communication systems.
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2.1.1 CaPiTo
CaPiTo [GNN09] is a framework that aims at connecting the abstract specica-
tion of Service-Oriented Systems with the standard protocol suites used in the
industry in a independent way, i.e., the description of the system in terms of
messages exchanged is separated from the description of which standard suites
are going to be used. This is the main novelty of CaPiTo and it helps sepa-
rating the concerns when modeling a Service-Oriented System. Furthermore,
this framework also allows the verication of the modeled protocols and the
generation of an implementation of parts of the system.
The CaPiTo framework is composed by three main abstraction levels, which
provide the framework with tools to support a specication language, means to
verify the security of the specied protocol, and the translation from a protocol
specication language into a language that can be executed. The levels are
presented in Figure 2.1.
 Abstract Level  this level describes the interaction of the services;
 Plugin Level  this level adds the identication of the industrial com-
munication protocols to the Abstract Level
 Concrete Level  this level adds, through systematic transformation,
the cryptographic modeling of the protocols. Furthermore, the necessary
annotations are added for compatibility with LySa [BBD+05], which can
then be veried with LySatool.
Figure 2.1: The abstraction levels in the CaPiTo framework.
2.1.1.1 Abstract Level
This level focuses on the interaction between the services by abstracting away
from the cryptography and also the communication protocols. The language on
this level was inspired by CaSPiS [BBDNL08], a process calculus developed in
the SENSORIA project [sen10], and its syntax is shown in Figure 2.2. In this
language, a service or protocol (P ) is built from basic activities such as service
invocation (n[ ]:P ) and service provision (n[ ]:P ), where the latter denes a
service that can be invoked by the former. The placeholders ([]) are used in the
Plugin level to specify the used security communication protocols. Furthermore,
a service can also be built by the restriction of another service (( n)P ), non-
deterministic choice between two services (P1 + P2), parallel composition of
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two services (P1jP2), replication of a service (!P ), and service return (" h~ei:P ).
Values (v; w) correspond to expressions without free variables such as messages
and keys, while expressions (e) can be names (n), variables x, or functions over
an array of expressions (f(~e)). A denition of a variable is denoted by ?x while
an application of a variable is denoted by x.
v; w ::= n j f(~v)
e ::= x j n j f(~e)
p ::= ?x j x j n
P ::= h~ei:P j (~p):P j ( n)P j P1jP2 j !P j P1 + P2 j
0 j n[ ]:P j n[ ]:P j " h~ei:P
Figure 2.2: Syntax of abstract specications in CaPiTo
2.1.1.2 Plugin Level
This level is extremely important for the CaPiTo framework because it extends
the service interaction from the Abstract Level with information regarding the
protocol suites that are going to be used. That is done by adding a list of
protocols suites to the specication of the Abstract Level. The syntax of this
language is shown in Figure 2.3. As it can be seen, the syntax is an extension of
the Abstract Level syntax where the element ps is added, and that element is
used to represent the protocol stack. For that reason, the elements are similar
to the ones presented in Figure 2.2 with the addition of the protocol stack (ps)
in the placeholders ([]) in the service provisioning and invocation constructs.
ps represents a list os security communication protocols (pi) that are added to
the service communications at this level. Each communication protocol (pi) is
dened by its name and its dierent parameters.
v; w ::= n j f(~v)
e ::= x j n j f(~e)
p ::= ?x j x j n
P ::= h~ei:P j (~p):P j ( n)P j P1jP2 j !P j P1 + P2 j
0 jn[ps]:P j n[ps]:P j " h~ei:P
ps ::= pi j pi; ps
pi ::= name; param1;    ; paramk
Figure 2.3: Syntax of plug-in specications in CaPiTo
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2.1.1.3 Concrete Level
At this level of CaPiTo, the communication protocols and the cryptography are
fully modeled. This level is the result of a systematic transformation from the
Plugin level and its syntax is shown in Figure 2.4. The transformation from
the Plugin level to the Concrete level has two main parts: the removal of the
service invocation and provision constructs and the expansion of the protocol
stack added in the Plugin level.
In order to remove the service invocation and provision constructs, unique ses-
sion identiers are used to distinguish between dierent services and sessions.
The unique session identiers are added to the service invocation (hr;~ei:P ),
service provision ((r; ~p):P ), and also to an added service that models communi-
cations through an encrypted tunnel (r : e I P ).
As for the expansion of the protocol stack, the stack in each service is unfolded
using the denitions of the standard protocol suites that are dened in the frame-
work. In order to model these denitions, cryptographic primitives are added
to the language. These primitives are asymmetric encryption (Pn+(:)) and de-
cryption (Pn (:)), digital signatures signing (Sn (:)) and validation (Sn+(:)),
and also an hash function (H(:)).
Finally, the necessary annotations are added in order to provide compatibility
with LySa [BBD+05], a process algebra used to describe communication proto-
cols and that can be veried by LySatool [Buc05].
v; w ::= n j n+ j n  j Pn+(~v) j Sn (~v) j H(~v) j f(~v)
e ::= x j n j n+ j n  j Pn+(~e) j Sn (~e) j H(~e) j f(~e)
p ::= ?x j x j n j n+ j n  j Pn (~p) j Sn+(~p)
P ::= hr;~ei:P j (r; ~p):P j ( n)P j !P j r : e I P j ( n)P j
P1 + P2 j P1jP2 j 0
Figure 2.4: Syntax of concrete specications in CaPiTo
Compared with CaPiTo, the language of the GSD framework is simpler and
more intuitive, GSD provides dierent perspectives of the system, and connects
to more verication tools. The GSD framework is targeted at system designers
that do not have specic knowledge of formal methods tools. While in CaPiTo
the system is only specied in an endpoint view, GSD has both the global view
(the more abstract specication of the system) and also the endpoint view of
the system, which enables the framework to connect to verication tools with
dierent modeling paradigms.
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2.1.2 AVANTSSAR
Another project with similar goals is AVANTSSAR [AVA11], which aims at
validating trust and security of Service-Oriented Architectures. AVANTSSAR
has ASLAN++ as the specication language that is used to specify trust and
security properties of services and their policies and then several automated
techniques are used to reason about services, their composition and the described
policies.
The AVANTSSAR project is complex and, when compared with the GSD frame-
work, it requires a higher level of expertise to start using. One of the goals of the
GSD fraemwork was for it to be a simple and precise tool, targeted at system
designers that want to easily model, test, and get the implementation of their
system. Another distinction between the two tools is that AVANTSSAR does
not provide automatic translation to an implementation language, functionality
that is present in the GSD framework and which I believe is important when
providing tools to help system designers.
2.1.3 The SPEAR II Framework
SPEAR II [HS99, LVH02] is a security protocol engineering and analysis frame-
work that extends the capabilities of the original SPEAR framework [BDGH97].
It aims at providing a multi-dimensional framework that enables secure and ef-
cient security protocol design and implementation. It has a graphical user in-
terface and it combines formal protocol specication, security and performance
analysis, meta-execution and automatic code generation.
One of the main reasons pointed by the authors that makes such a framework
needed is that, even in the case where the protocol design is theoretically correct,
it does not guarantee the development of a secure crypto-system because the
translation from the design phase to the implementation phase is often the most
error-prone phase.
The framework comprises of ve dierent, although interconnected, areas:
 Security protocol design - provides an interface for the specication of
security protocols;
 Automated security analysis - analyses the protocol for possible at-
tacks;
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 Performance evaluation and reporting - provides some information
regarding protocol performance;
 Automatic code generation - safely generates Java code for the de-
signed protocol;
 Meta-execution - makes it possible for the designer to test the designed
protocol without the need of a real system.
An overview of the SPEAR II Framework is given in Figure 2.5, where it is
possible to see the ve dierent aforementioned areas that constitute the frame-
work.
Figure 2.5: The SPEAR II framework
The protocol specication is done through the GYPSIE module and it is used
in all the dierent areas of the framework. The security analysis module has
the Attack Construction Engine (ACE) at its core. It is based in a model that
converts the reachability problem (nding a state that veries an error condi-
tion) into a constraint solving problem. The model uses the Dolev-Yao attacker
model [DY83]. Another tool that belongs to the security analysis module is
the Graphical Attack Conduction Environment (GRACE). It assists the user
in the ACE analysis by having her specifying, through the GUI, extra protocol
properties needed for the analysis. As for the automatic code generation, the
Protocol Code Generator (PCG) parses an abstract GYPSIE specication and
generates a secure implementation of this specication in Java. The message
formatting is specied using ASN.1 [Uni11], making it possible for the imple-
mentations to communicate with other non-SPEAR II implementations, as long
as they conform to the same standard. PCG does not build an intermediate
parse tree from the protocol specication, as done by the majority of the proto-
col translator tools. It does not need to do that because the GYPSIE module
deals with the semantic checking and symbol references. All that is needed
then is to directly translate the GYPSIE data structures into Java code. The
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code is generated using code templates that contain tokens that are replaced by
generated code and it follows the structure shown in Figure 2.6. The commu-
nication layer handles all network connections, the Principal Control handles
the principal application, Protocol Logic and Message Handling are the proto-
col implementation, independent of the above layers, and the Security Services
layer acts as an interface to the supported cryptographic libraries.
Figure 2.6: Structure of the generated code
The framework does not generate the Java code relying only on the GYPSIE
protocol specication, since certain aspects of the protocol, such as checking
the freshness of a nonce, are not present in the specication. That is the main
reason for the existence of the Generation Environment (GENIE). It provides a
way for the protocol designer to control the implementation process by specify-
ing properties such as cryptographic and communication settings and message
processing actions. The cryptographic settings allow the user to specify crypto-
graphic libraries and algorithms while the communication settings allow him to
specify transport protocol and port numbers.
SPEAR II supports cryptographic protocol specication in a way that "security
and performance analysis, meta-execution and automatic code generation [...]
can be conducted", providing an important environment for security protocol
design.
The GSD framework is simpler than SPEAR II, which entails a smaller learn-
ing curve for the system designer, provides the connections to external formal
methods tools  which I believe to be important  and has a higher degree
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of exibility. The latter is reected on how simple it is to extend the GSD
framework with new security requirements when modeling system, connections
to new formal methods tools, and also output to new languages.
2.1.4 The Automatic Generation, Verication and Imple-
mentation of Security Protocols Toolkit
The Automatic Generation, Verication and Implementation of Security Proto-
cols (AGVI) toolkit [SPP01] allows the system designer to describe the security
requirements and the system specication. Then a protocol generator will cre-
ate candidate protocols that satisfy the given system requirements. After that,
Athena [SBP01], a protocol screener, will analyze the protocols and discard the
ones that do not satisfy the desired security properties. After each evaluation
procedure, Athena returns a counter-example in case the protocol does not sat-
isfy the required properties, or a proof if the properties are satised. Finally,
a code generator automatically translates the formal protocol specication into
Java code.
What distinguishes the GSD framework from the AGVI toolkit is the simpler
and more intuitive modeling language of the former and also its versatility, i.e., it
is simple to extend the GSD framework with new formal verication tools, new
output languages, new abstract ways of representing message security prop-
erties in the modeling language (extending the security modules presented in
Section 4.2), and also new ways of implementing the dierent security modules.
2.2 Formally Proven Specications and Their Im-
plementations
There exists more targeted work on the modeling and implementation of secure
communication systems that is worth mentioning in this chapter. When com-
pared to the GSD framework, these tools support a more concrete modeling
language and target a specic verication tool.
2.2.1 FS2PV
FS2PV [BFGT08] is a tool that derives a formal model from a protocol code
and symbolic libraries. The protocol code is written in a rst-order subset of
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F#, which the authors named F. It is a subset with simple formal semantics fa-
cilitating model extraction, with primitives for communication and concurrency,
but it does not allow higher-order functions and some imperative features, such
as recursion.
The translation is made to applied -calculus, which can then be veried by
ProVerif (Section 2.5.3). When the theorems are proved with ProVerif, it means
that those properties are present in the source code programs dened in F and,
therefore, that the communication protocol is secure.
2.2.2 Other
Bhargavan et al. [BFGP04] dened TulaFale, a language to describe security
protocols based on SOAP. TulaFale uses pi-calculus as its core for describing
the dierent principals and extends it with XML syntax, logical predicates, and
correspondence assertions. The latter are used to specify the authentication
goals of the system. A description of a communication system in TulaFale is
translated into applied pi-calculus in order to verify the authentication proper-
ties of SOAP protocols with ProVerif.
Swamy et al. [SCF+11] developed a dependently typed language (F*) aimed
at secure distributed programming. Programs written in F* are translated to
.NET byte-code.
Other more recent work [CB12] enables the verication of a protocol with Cryp-
toVerif [Bla08] and then translates that specication into OCaml.
Another recent work by Modesti [Mod11] presents AnBx. An extension of AnB,
which presented in Section 2.3.2, that targets the declarative modeling of dis-
tributed protocols, also uses OFMC to verify that specication and further
translates that to Java.
2.3 Abstraction Language for Service-Oriented Sys-
tems
Another important part of the research presented in this thesis concerns the
choice of language used to model the communication systems. For that reason,
a review of the state-of-the-art in this area is extremely important.
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2.3.1 KLAIM
KLAIM [DNFP98] is a process calculus that supports a programming paradigm
where processes move between dierent computing environments. This is dier-
ent from the usual way of programming where data is what is explicitly moved
between the dierent environments, i.e., where data is sent and received between
dierent entities in a network. In KLAIM, however, the communication over the
network is not modeled by explicitly sending and receiving data, but by having
the processes reading and writing in the dierent tuple spaces.
With KLAIM, the network structure is explicitly modeled and the language
provides coordination mechanisms to control the interaction between processes.
KLAIM has Linda [Gel85] at its core and extends it with multiple tuple spaces
and processes' operators. Linda is a coordination language that uses an asyn-
chronous and associative communication mechanism based on a tuple space, a
shared global environment that contains sequences of information items.
As previously mentioned, the use of a tuple space is extended in KLAIM: instead
of having a single tuple space, KLAIM uses multiple tuple spaces, one for each
locality. The other extension from Linda is the denition of operators for process
construction and composition, inspired by Milner's CCS. Furthermore, a Type
System is used to describe the intentions of processes regarding other localities,
such as read, write, and execute.
2.3.2 AnB
AnB [M09] is a language based on the Alice and Bob notation (Section 1.3.1)
and it is dened over an arbitrary algebraic theory. Based on the algebraic
properties of its operators, it denes unambiguously how a specied protocol is
supposed to be run by honest agents. The specication of a protocol in AnB
consists of four sections, presented in Figure 2.7.
The semantics of AnB are expressed in a formalism called IF and more infor-
mation on this translation and the use of AnB is given when presenting the
Open-source Fixed-Point Model Checker in Section 2.5.2.
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 Types - all the identiers used in the protocol are declared. If an identier
is a variable, it must start with upper-case, if it is a global constant or
function, it must start with lower-case. Furthermore, the agents present in
the protocol are also named and are called roles. Whether the name starts
with upper-case, then the agent is considering dishonest in the protocol
analysis, otherwise it is consider honest;
 Knowledge - the initial knowledge for each role is specied here. If a
variable does not appear here, it is assumed to be freshly created;
 Actions - in this section, the list of exchanged messages is specied, de-
scribing the normal execution of the protocol;
 Goals - the goals that the protocol wants to achieve are described in this
last part.
Figure 2.7: Sections of the AnB code
2.3.3 CaSPiS
CaSPiS [BBDNL08] was developed with the goal of making the modeling of
Service-Oriented Systems easier. This was motivated by several important as-
pects of Service-Oriented Systems such as service autonomy, client-server inter-
action, and the orchestration of services.
CaSPiS is a process algebra where, for the reasons mentioned above, sessions
and pipelines have a crucial role. Sessions are two-sided and allow protocols
to be executed by each side and pipelines enable the orchestration of data ow
produced by the dierent sessions.
2.4 Channel Abstractions
Channel abstractions strongly inuenced the security modules present in the
GSD framework (Section 4.2) and, therefore, they are presented here.
Channel abstractions were rst introduced by Maurer and Schmid [MS96]. This
work establishes secure channels at a high level of abstraction: channels are
regarded as an abstraction of the transport of a message from an input to an
output and the dierent possibilities regarding the exclusiveness of access to the
input and output give rise to dierent kinds of channels:
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 Authentic: exclusive access to the input;
 Condential: exclusive access to the output;
 Secure: exclusive access to both the input and the output;
In the literature, a common motivation for the use of abstract channels is the
necessity of separating concerns when modeling and developing systems. Chan-
nel abstractions allow one to have a simpler vision of the system (focused on its
functionality) without the need to consider the security details at such an early
stage of development.
In the aforementioned work [MS96], Maurer and Schmid characterize a channel
by its direction, its time of availability and its security properties. Furthermore,
they identify the security goals that might be relevant in a distributed systems,
such as secrecy, authentication and non-repudiation.
Establishing security in a distributed system, as the authors describe, consists
of two phases:
 Initialization Phase: where the set up of security parameters occurs in a
secure environment;
 Connection Phase: occurs over insecure channels and cryptographic tech-
niques are applied in order to achieve the required security level in the
channels.
Therefore, a protocol transforms the set of security parameters and the insecure
channels into a set of secure channels, specied by the security requirements. A
communication channel can be seen, at a high level of abstraction, as means for
transporting a message from a source entity to a destination entity.
Lastly, the authors state that the paper was not intended to be applied for the
design or security verication. Its original main goal was to illustrate interesting
aspects of distributed systems security.
Another important work on channel abstractions is by Abadi et al. [AFG02]
where three main contributions are given: a simple, high-level language (sjoin-
calculus), which is a variant of the join-calculus [FG00] with constructs that en-
able the creation and use of channels; a translation from that high-level language
to a low-level language that includes cryptographic primitives. This translation
maps communication on secure channels to encrypted communication on public
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channels; and nally, a correctness theorem for the translation that allows the
reasoning about programs with the high-level language.
Their main motivation for this work is the fact that application code, in their
view, should not be concerned with lower-level details. To avoid that, they de-
fend using abstractions and services that encapsulate cryptographic operations.
In other words, the high-level abstraction hides the diculties and details of
network security: systems run as if they were on the same machine and security
is provided for them. This is also one of the main reasons for the use of the
security modules on the GSD framework (they are introduced in Section 4.2).
In the translation from the sjoin-calculus to join-calculus, each channel X is
mapped to a key pair fX+,X g. The authors present, in fact, two kinds of
translations: a compositional translation from join to sjoin and another one
that puts the resulting join processes in a context that lters every communica-
tion with the environment. In this translation all communications are equally
protected, as if all the communications had a secure channel as described above.
Adao and Fournet [AF06] present a variant of the -calculus that adds secure
communication, mobile names and high-level certicates but does not have ex-
plicit cryptography. The security properties of a system are studied in the
presence of an arbitrary, abstract adversary, recurring to trace properties and
observational equivalences. The veried security properties can be achieved, the
authors argue, with some care in a concrete setting with standard cryptographic
primitives. They aim at building security abstractions with formal semantics
and sound computational implementations by developing a sound and complete
implementation of a distributed process calculus. Their system provides uniform
protection of all messages. They denominate that kind of protection as authen-
tication, but it resembles, in fact, the secure channels previously introduced by
Maurer and Schmid.
Bugliesi and Giunti [BG07] present a secure implementation of a typed -
calculus where capability types are employed to realize the policies for the access
control to communication channels. Therefore, the dierent channel types (au-
thentic, condential, and secure) are implemented by means of resource control
of the communication channel.
A translation is given from high-level type capabilities to an implementation that
has term capabilities protected by encryption keys that are only known by the
intended principals. Typed equivalences of the high-level calculus correspond to
the untyped equivalences of the low-level cryptographic calculus.
The channel types, ch(.), are used to model the dierent security properties and
represent the access to the channel. The types are a combination of reading(r)
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and writing(w) capabilities and a lattice is dened over those values, as it is
show in Figure 2.8.
T
wr
rw
Figure 2.8: Channel types access capabilities lattice
Bugliesi and Focardi [BF10] aim at identifying abstractions that are adequate
for, on one hand, high-level programming and specication and, on the other
hand, security analysis and verication. That was done because, in their opinion
(and as we have already seen, in the opinion of many others), there are two
important security areas in distributed systems where attention should be payed
to: having formal low-level specications and allowing those low-level details to
be abstracted away when programming those systems, allowing the focus to be
on the systems functionality. The calculus used is one previously presented by
the same authors [BF08] and that calculus is analyzed with various bi-simulation
based security equivalences, with dierent attacker capabilities, and also with
the attacker having an increased control over the network. The same three
types of channels commonly used by other authors are used: authentic, secret
(sometimes called condential) and secure. Furthermore, a new set of security
abstractions is provided and the primitives of these security abstractions can be
seen as a Kernel API.
Mödersheim and Viganò [MV09b] assume three kinds of channels: authentic,
condential and secure (the commonly used combinations introduced by Maurer
and Schmid[MS96]) that can be used either as assumptions or as goals. When-
ever a channel is used as an assumption, the communication being modeled
relies on that channel and the security properties it represents. On the other
hand, if a channel is used as a goal, it means that the modeled communication
establishes the security properties of that channel. The channels (shown in Fig-
ure 2.9) are modeled in the AnBbullet language, which extends AnB[M09] with
support for channel specication. It is worth noting that the use of the bullets
in this language can be interpreted as modeling the exclusiveness of access to
the communication channel mentioned by Maurer and Schmid [MS96].
The authors present two models for channels as assumptions. The ideal channel
model (ICM), which represents the ideal functionality of the channel, and the
cryptographic channel model (CCM), which represents the implementation of
the channels by cryptography. As the authors claim, relating these two models
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 A  ! B : M - authentic channel from A to B;
 A !  B : M - condential channel from A to B;
 A  !  B : M - secure channel from A to B (channel is both authentic
and condential).
Figure 2.9: AnB channels
enables one to get insight to the meaning of channels as assumptions and it also
allows for interchangeability in analysis tools.
Furthermore, the authors also propose a new, stronger, authentication goal be-
cause the standard one is too weak. They also identify a general composition
problem, the interpretation of messages in dierent protocols that are similar
and that might enable messages to be read in places where they were not sup-
posed to. These two issues are discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.1. In
fact, that stronger authentication goal (with freshness guaranteed) was taken in
consideration when AnBx [BM11] was developed, which directly supports the
modeling of authentic and secure channels with freshness guarantees and further
translates those into the AnB specication used by OFMC.
2.5 Protocol Verication Tools and Languages
In this section, the state-of-the-art of tools and languages targeted at protocol
verication is presented. Firstly, the external tools used in the GSD framework
are reviewed, LySatool in Section 2.5.1 and OFMC in Section 2.5.2. Then
ProVerif is also reviewed in Section 2.5.3.
2.5.1 LySatool
LySatool [Buc05] is a tool that performs security analysis of protocols described
in LySa (presented below). LySatool is implemented in Standard ML and it
starts by encoding the ow logic specication (written in LySa) into an ALFP
formula, where the sets of terms are encoded by tree grammars. ALFP is an
expressive fragment of rst order predicate logic that is interpreted over a nite
universe. Succinct Solver [NNS+04] uses the ALFP specication to compute
the least solution to ow constraints. LySatool receives the LySa specication
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of a system as input and performs a static analysis in the presence of a Dolev-
Yao [DY83] attacker. If the output of the analysis is positive, then the protocol
satises the specied notations. On the other hand, if the output is not positive,
then an attack might exist. In that case, further analysis has to be performed in
order to nd whether it was a false negative or if a real attack was discovered.
The grammar for the processes that LySatool accepts as input is described
in 2.10.
Figure 2.10: LySatool grammar
2.5.1.1 The Language - LySa
LySa [BBD+05] is a process algebra based on standard protocol narrations ex-
tended with annotations. These annotations were added in order to improve the
standard protocol narrations, which are usually imprecise about (important) de-
tails related to the deployment of the described protocol. With this addition,
the protocol narration becomes clearer and with less space for ambiguity when
the analysis is performed.
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LySa is based on the Spi-calculus [AG99], which extends the -calculus [MPW92a,
MPW92b] with the use of encrypted values. LySa is similar to these calculi, al-
though it diers from them mainly in two aspects:
 LySa's underlying model does not use individual channel communication
between the dierent principals, but one main channel where all the com-
munications go through. This results in a model closer to what we want
to represent and analyze, since an attacker might have the capability of
eavesdropping the communications;
 In LySa, the tests associated with input and decryption are performed
using pattern matching.
In the LySa specication only the legitimate part of the system are described.
That specication shall be explicit about using the protocol in a general set-
ting, where many principals might use the protocol simultaneously. Each of
the principals, denominated I1; :::; In may serve as an initiator (usually A), as
a responder (usually B) or even as both (which means that, when modeled this
way, the principal runs the protocol with himself). Furthermore, LySa adopts
the assumption of perfect cryptography, which can be approximated in a real
implementation by using a secure cryptographic system.
The attacker outside the legitimate part is given the name I0. To model this
attacker, a formula inspired in the studies of Dolev and Yao[DY83] was dened.
The attacker has some initial knowledge, it can expand that knowledge by eaves-
dropping the network, by decrypting messages with keys it already knows, or
by encrypting new messages using the keys he knows, and it may engage in new
communications.
2.5.1.2 LySa Syntax
The LySa language is formed by terms and processes. Whenever terms without
free variables are present, we call them values. It has structures for represent-
ing input and output on the network, parallel composition of processes (the
principals of a protocol are modeled running in parallel), restriction of values
to specic processes, replication and symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic
operations (encryption and decryption). Furthermore, the end of a process is
represented by 0. The full syntax is shown in Figure 2.11.
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E ::= terms
n name
m+, m  public and private keys
x variable
fE1; :::; EkgE0 [at l1 dest l2] symmetric encryption (k  0)
fjE1; :::; EkjgE0 [at l1 dest l2] asymmetric encryption (k  0)
P ::= processes
0 nil
hE1; :::; Eki:P output
(E1; :::Ej ;xj+1; :::; xk):P input with matching
P1jP2 parallel composition
( n)P restriction
(m)P restriction(key pair)
!P replication
decrypt E as fE1; :::; Ej ;xj+1; :::; xkgE0 symmetric decryption
[at l1 orig l2] in P with matching
decrypt E as fjE1; :::; Ej ;xj+1; :::; xkjgE0 asymmetric decryption
[at l1 orig l2] in P with matching
Figure 2.11: LySa syntax description
One can note that when using pattern matching  in decryption and input  a
semi-colon separates the components that are being matched (on the left) from
the variables to which the received values are assigned to (on the right). Also,
it is possible to see the presence of the assertions for origin and destination,
which decorate the protocol text with cryptopoints, important for the analy-
sis. In these assertions, l1 represents a cryptopoint and l2 represents a list of
cryptopoints in the protocol. In LySa, cryptopoints are used as a way to spec-
ify where a term is being encrypted and where it is supposed to be decrypted.
This description makes it easier for the analysis to detect some of the security
violations.
2.5.2 The Open-source Fixed-point Model Checker
The Open-Source Fixed-Point Model-Checker [MV09a], also known as OFMC,
is a symbolic security protocol analyzer that detects attacks on the protocol
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and both performs a bounded session verication by exploring the transition
system of the protocol representation and an unbounded session verication
using xed-point based techniques.
OFMC's primary input language is the Intermediate Format (IF) [AVI03] speci-
cation, which describes a security protocol as an innite-state transition system
using set rewriting. The tool also accepts AnB [M09] as input, which is then
automatically translated to IF, dening a formal semantics for AnB in terms of
IF. This translation is performed by dening a state machine for each principal
described in the protocol.
OFMC uses several techniques that signicantly reduce the search space of a
protocol without introducing, or excluding, any attacks. Two of the major
used techniques are lazy intruder and constraint dierentiation. The rst is
a symbolic representation of the intruder while the latter is a general search-
reduction technique.
2.5.3 ProVerif
ProVerif [Bla09] is a protocol verication tool that provides a fully automatic
way of verifying, among others, authentication and secrecy of communication
protocols. It does so by verifying correspondences in the modeled protocols
with an unbounded number of sessions. Correspondences are properties that
represent associations between certain events, enabling the reasoning of authen-
tication, secrecy, and other properties. Correspondences can be used to describe,
for example, that if one event happens, then another event has to have happened
at some point in the past.
Blanchet's denition of authentication is that, when a protocol is used to au-
thenticate Alice to Bob, then when Bob thinks he is talking to Alice, he really
is talking to Alice. The use of correspondences for verifying authentication is
in fact similar to the notion of agreements (injective and non-injective) used
by Lowe [Low97]: an event is registered when Alice starts the communication
and the correspondent nal event is registered by Bob when nishing the com-
munication. Lowe's non-injective agreement corresponds to a protocol where
two or more end events might occur for each start event. On the other hand,
Lowe's injective agreement is present when there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the start and end event.
Blanchet denes the secrecy of a value M by the impossibility of an attacker to
obtain that value M after the protocol is executed. In correspondences, that is
modeled by an event that species that the attacker is able to seeM and secrecy
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is achieved when that event does not occur after executing the communication
protocol.
The protocol is modeled in the applied -calculus, a process calculus presented
by Blanchet [Bla02] that extends -calculus with cryptographic primitives. The
last version of ProVerif [Bla09] further extends the applied -calculus with
events, which model the correspondences. The specication of a communication
protocol in applied -calculus with the events annotations is translated into a set
of Horn clauses that is used by a resolution-based solver to analyze the modeled
protocol and prove the dierent properties modeled by the correspondences. If
a proof is not found, ProVerif tries to reconstruct an attack using a derivation
of the Horn clauses.
The verication performed in ProVerif might not terminate since the tool per-
forms protocol verication for an unbounded number of sessions, which was
shown to be an undecidable problem by Durgin et al. [DLMS04]. This means
that not all the protocols can be veried. The way ProVerif and other veriers
minimize this is by using techniques, such as abstract interpretation, that make
the system easier to reason about. This leads to a verication process that is
not complete (i.e., false attacks might be found), but sound (when an attack is
not found, the specied properties are veried). The abstractions performed by
ProVerif simplies the problem of verifying communication protocols. However,
the simplications used by ProVerif do not produce a nite state space (due
to the unbounded number of sessions) and thus, despite these approximations,
the tool may still not terminate. In practice, however, ProVerif terminates (and
quickly) on many real-world protocols. On the other hand, approximations are
the source for non-completeness: the price to pay for termination very often is
that sometimes false positives are detected.
Weidenbach [Wei99] can be cited as the main inspiration for Blanchet's work,
since he proposed the application of resolution-based theorem proving to the
problem of protocol verication.
Selinger [Sel03] showed the duality of theorem proving and satisability for the
problem of verifying protocols: a single model for a protocol and a security
property is needed to establish that the protocol satises the property. Selinger
also uses one single predicate to formalize the knowledge of the attacker.
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2.6 Belief Logics
In 1990, Burrows, Abadi, and Needham [BAN90] introduced the BAN logic
for the reasoning of beliefs in distributed systems. This logic describes the
beliefs of the honest principals of the system and that is done by annotating an
idealized protocol with expressions that represent the beliefs of the principals.
The reasoning of the protocol properties is done by checking which formulas
(derived from the initial assumptions of the protocol and its annotations) hold
as conclusions.
The idealization of the modeled protocol is a usual step when one wants to use
the BAN logic. This step is not systematic and it can lead to, for example,
having the same idealized protocol of variations of a protocol where those vari-
ations are crucial to its security. This step is needed when using the BAN logic
in cases where it is not clear what the role of the exchanged elements is in the
communication protocol. This step is not problematic in the GSD framework
because the system is modeled at a higher level of abstraction and the elements
in the more concrete levels are previously dened. For this reason, the roles
of the exchanged elements are also predened and allow for the analysis of the
system.
In this Section, the BAN logic is introduced together with other work that
reviews the logic.
2.6.1 A Logic of Authentication
The BAN logic describes the beliefs of the trustworthy parties involved in the de-
scribed protocol, which allows for the reasoning about knowledge in distributed
computation and, more specically, in authentication protocols.
The BAN logic was created with the aim of answering several questions with
the help of formal methods. These questions are, for example:
 Does the given communication protocol work?
 What does it achieve?
 Does one protocol need more initial assumptions than the other?
 Does a protocol do anything unnecessary?
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The logic operates at an abstract level and, therefore, does not consider errors
in the implementation of the protocol. It introduces notation that allows for the
expression of dierent kinds of belief. The authors introduce predicates like P
believes in X, P sees X, P said X, P controls P, among others that say,
for example, that an element is fresh and express other beliefs regarding the
usage and secrecy of keys. These predicates are presented in more detail in
Section 3.1.1.
This logic uses idealized protocols, which provide a more explicit and cleaner
information about the usage of the elements of the messages. The translation
to the idealized version of a protocol tries to remove any ambiguities that might
exist regarding the usage of the dierent elements of the exchange messages,
making it easier to derive a practical encoding from these idealized protocol. As
previously mentioned, one of the main problems of BAN logic is the fact that
the idealization process is not a systematic process. Not having a systematic
way of generating the idealized protocol makes the analysis of the protocol error-
prone. This happens due to possible ambiguities and dierent interpretations
of non-idealized protocols that might be translated in dierent ways into the
idealized version. That is clearly seen when two dierent versions of a protocol,
with small but crucial dierences, originate the same idealized protocol.
The analysis of the protocol modeled with the BAN logic relies heavily on its
annotations. An annotation of a protocol is a sequence of comments about the
beliefs of principals and what they see. For the analysis to be successful, initial
assumptions must be made regarding the keys that are initially shared, which
values are fresh, who are the trusted principals, etc. Then, a protocol is veried
by analyzing the initial assumptions together with the annotations in order to
prove that a given formula holds as conclusion.
2.6.2 Reviews of the BAN logic
Syverson [Syv91] defends that there is some confusion regarding the goals and
capabilities of the BAN Logic. As he notes, the BAN logic was designed for
reasoning about the evolution of the belief and trust of the participants in a
protocol. He goes on to explain that one uses formal semantics to help gain
understanding of the abilities and limitations of logics and that one should be
careful not to analyze the wrong properties while using a specic logic. Syverson
highlights that the authors of the BAN logic say that using just their notion
of belief would be harmful in the study of security properties and he defends
that the BAN Logic was extremely important in establishing requirements of
any logic for protocol analysis, but should not be used as a formal method for
that purpose.
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Liebl [Lie93] explains that there are two kinds of logics for protocol analysis: the
Logic of Knowledge and the Logic of Belief. While the former concerns the view
of the intruder and is related to the security of a protocol, the latter concerns
the views of the legitimate principals and is related with the functionality of the
protocol. BAN Logic is Logic of Belief and the author describes it as a logic
where protocols are viewed at a high level of abstraction, that cannot discover
aws that might occur when users are able to play multiple roles. Furthermore,
Liebl also notes that the BAN logic's lack of systematic translation from the
protocol specication to the idealized protocol is a problem.
Boyd and Mao [BM93] state that it is easy for the BAN Logic to approve
protocols that are in practice unsound. They argue that the main reason for
that is the lack of precision of the idealization process, its inability to express
certain events. The main point for this argument is the fact that variations of
protocols may not be easily distinguishable in BAN logic, but they are critical
for the protocols security. The authors expand this idea by proposing that
a logic that does not require idealization should be developed. They do not,
however, put forth such a logic.
2.7 SAT and SMT
SMT is an important part of the Beliefs and Knowledge tool that is presented
in Section 5.3.1. In this section, SAT is rstly introduced and followed by
presentation of SMT, which is an extension of SAT.
There are several situations where one needs to verify the fulllment of several
dierent constraints. For example, when determining the lecture schedule that
has to have in consideration the availability of rooms, teachers, and students.
One way of solving that is by using propositional logic formulas to express those
constraints on variables. In their simplest form, these variables are Boolean
values (either true or false) and this gives rise to the Boolean Satisability
problem, also know as Propositional Satisability or SAT: for a given propo-
sitional formula over Boolean variables, nd a satisfying assignment for the
variables or give a proof that no satisfying assignment exists [MZ09].
The propositional formulas are constructed with three operators: AND, OR, and
NOT. Having two formulas, f and g, the semantics of the operators is shown in
Figure 2.12.
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 NOT f: evaluates to true if f evaluates to false and evaluates to false if f
evaluates to true;
 f AND g: evaluates to true when both f and g evaluate to true, and
evaluates to false otherwise;
 f OR g: evaluates to FALSE when both f and g evaluate to false, and
evaluates to true otherwise.
Figure 2.12: SAT operators semantics
An example of a SAT formula is:
(x1 OR x2) AND (NOT x3)
If the variables are assigned with the values x1 = true, x2 = false, and x3 =
false, then the formula evaluates to true, i.e., a satisfying assignment for the
formula was found. If x3 = true, then the formula evaluates to false, regardless
of the values of x1 and x2. It might be the case that no satisfying assignment
of variables exists for a formula. Consider, for example, the simple formula:
x1 AND (NOT x1)
There is no assignment for the variable x1 that satises this formula, i.e., that
makes the formula evaluate to true. In this case, the problem is over-constrained
and the formula is said to be unsatisable. It is worth nothing that validity is
dual to unsatisability and that, therefore, knowing that x1 AND (NOT x1) is
unsatisable also allows us to reason about its negation:
NOT (x1 AND (NOT x1))
This formula is in fact valid, i.e., satisable in every model because, as it was
shown above, its negation is unsatisable.
Determining whether there is a satisable assignment of the variables in a for-
mula is an NP-complete problem, but practical advances have enabled SAT solv-
ing to be ecient despite its formal complexity. One of those advances, widely
used by SAT solvers, is the systematic search approach. The search space used
in this approach is a binary tree where each vertex represents a variable and
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each of its edges represents the possible values for that variable (either true or
false). Therefore, each of the paths from the root to a leaf corresponds to an as-
signment of values to each of the variables in the formula. The most well-known
algorithm using this systematic search approach is DPLL [DP60, DLL62].
Satisability Module Theory (SMT) [DMB11] extends SAT for cases where
Boolean values are not enough. This extensions is made by having the variables
governed by one or more underlying theories, such as Linear Integer Arithmetic,
Dierence Logic, Arrays, Lists, and Uninterpreted Functions.
In SMT, the atoms in one theory (or in a combination of dierent theories)
are abstracted into Boolean values and then the SAT engine searches for an
assignment that satises the formula. If no assignment is found, then the SMT
formula is unsatisable. On the other hand, if an assignment is found, theory
solvers are used to check if the formulas that were abstracted are valid under
the dierent theories in use.
Considering the following SMT formula:
NOT (x < 5) AND (x < 3 OR x = 10)
The atoms of the formula are then abstracted into Booleans, which results in
the formula:
NOT (v1) AND (v2 OR v3)
A model for this formula is, for example, (v1 = false; v2 = true; v3 = false).
After having the model, the theory solver is used to check if the atoms hold
in relation to those values in the underlying theories, and, as one can see, this
is not the case due to the values of v1 and v2. On the other hand, the model
(v1 = false; v2 = false; v3 = true) holds in the underlying theory.
2.8 Code Generation
Being able to generate code from the system specication is essential to provide
the developer with the code that implements the modeled system. Firstly, a
commonly used tool for language translation is presented in Section 2.8.1 on the
following page. After that, a solution for language translation using a functional
language is presented in Section 2.8.2 on the next page.
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2.8.1 ANTLR
ANTLR, which stands for ANother Tool for Language Recognition, is a parser
generator developed by Terence Parr [Par07]. It is, in fact, a framework for gen-
erating recognizers, interpreters, compilers and translators based on grammati-
cal descriptions, and besides providing support for building lexers and parsers,
it also supports tree construction and tree walking. Parsers can generate ab-
stract syntax trees (AST) which can be further analyzed with tree walkers. The
framework also has a tight integration with the StringTemplate [Par09], which
makes it suitable for translating from one language to another.
One exible option when using ANTLR for code to code translation is to make
it generate the lexer, the parser, and the tree walker that performs the transla-
tion. A possible process of using ANTLR as a language translator is shown in
Figure 2.13.
Lexer
Protocol
Specification
Parser
Symbol
Stream
Tree Walker
AST
Translated
Code
String
Templates
Figure 2.13: ANTLR possible translation process
2.8.2 Code generation in F#
F# is a functional programming language developed by Microsoft Research. It
is a scripted, imperative object oriented language available in the .NET platform
that combines type safety, succinctness, performance expressivity and scripting.
When using F#, one possibility is to use FsLex and FsYacc to generate the
lexer and the parser and those will output an abstract syntax tree. Having
that syntax tree and F# being a functional language, it makes it fairly simple
to analyze and translate that abstract syntax tree. More details about that
process are given in Section 7.2.
Chapter 3
The Beliefs And Knowledge
Tool
The Beliefs and Knowledge (BAK) tool was developed to verify the security of
communication protocols by reasoning about the beliefs and the knowledge that
the dierent principals involved in a communication system acquire throughout
the message exchange. The tool uses the Z3 SMT Solver [DMB08] and adds an
extra layer that facilitates the modeling of message exchanges and the reasoning
about those messages. This extra layer is composed of a set of predened system
and inference rules, presented in Section 3.1.1.
3.1 The Logic
The logic used in this tool is strongly inspired by belief logics such as the BAN
logic [BAN90]. This logic focuses on the knowledge the legitimate principals
are able to infer from a message exchange, and is targeted at reasoning about
authentication. It is not, however, that easy to directly reason about conden-
tiality with such logics. This is the case because condentiality concerns what
some attacker might, or might not, be able to see from a message exchange and
the BAN logic was not design to explicitly reason about attacker knowledge.
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There are several approaches that one can take to reason about condentiality
in this case. In the work presented here, the normal belief logic is extended
with explicit reasoning about the attacker knowledge: the beliefs he is able to
infer from the message exchange and also what he is able to see, and what he is
not able to see regarding the exchanged messages, which is of great importance
when reasoning about condentiality. This approach was chosen mainly because
it results in a model that is simple and easy to reason about.
Furthermore, in this work, attackers are considered to have the capabilities of
the Dolev-Yao attacker [DY83], i.e., he is not only able to see all the exchanged
messages but also capable of initiating protocol communications with legitimate
principals and to generate new messages based on acquired knowledge.
3.1.1 Logic Predicates
The logic is composed by principals and elements (all the terms that can be sent
from one principal to another). The dierent predicates in the logic are shown
in Figure 3.1. X and Y are used to represent principals and el, el1, and el2 are
used to represent elements.
 Sees(X,el) - X sees a specic element el;
 Believes(X,el) -X believes in a specic element el;
 Said(X,el) - X said, at some point in time, a specic element el;
 Says(X,el) - X recently said element el;
 Fresh(el) - expresses the fact that the element el is fresh;
 MsgSent(X,Y,el) - X sent element el to Y;
 Conc(el1,el2) - element that is the concatenation of two elements el1
and el2;
Figure 3.1: Predicates in the logic used in the BAK tool
The rst ve predicates in Figure 3.1 are taken from BAN logic while the last
two predicates were dened specically for the BAK tool, since they make it
simpler to reason about the system. The semantics of the predicates are given
by the rules presented below.
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3.1.2 The Logic Rules
There are several rules that constitute the core engine of the BAK tool. These
are the system and belief rules, the cryptography rules, and the attacker model
rules. They specify the way the principals are able to exchange, construct, and
read the messages, and how they acquire the dierent beliefs and they are shown
in the sections below, where X and Y represent specic principals, attacker
represents the attacker, el represents an element, m represents a message in
plain-text, Enc(el; k) represents the encryption of the element el with the key
k, and pubKey(X) and privKey(X) represent, respectively, the public-keys and
private-keys of a principal X. Details on the implementation of these rules are
given in Section 7.3.2.
3.1.2.1 System and Belief Rules
 all the principals are distinct;
 all principals see the public keys of the other principals. This is an abstrac-
tion of an infrastructure that allows the principals to retrieve the public
key of other principals;
 rules used to implement the required domain restriction. More details are
given in Section 7.3.3.
 MsgSent(X,Y,el) =) Sees(Y,el) ^ Sees(attacker,el) - when a mes-
sage is sent between two principals, both the intended receiver and the
attacker are able to see the message. This rule exists to enable the reason-
ing of beliefs in the system. If reliability of the network was not assumed
(for example, if the attacker had control over the network), it would not
allow for the reasoning of the system security properties. This reasoning
is based on the acquired beliefs and on which elements are seen by the
dierent principals and, since the attacker could retain all the sent mes-
sages, it could lead to a situation where no element would be seen by any
of the principals, aecting the reasoning of the security properties;
 Believes(Y,Said(X,el)) ^ Believes(Y,Fresh(el))
=) Believes(Y,Says(X,el)) - If Y believes that X sent an element at
some point in time and if he believes that that element is fresh, then he
is entitled to believe that X recently sent that element;
 Sees(X,Conc(el1,el2)) =) (Sees(X,el1) ^ Sees(X,el2)) - if X sees
the concatenation of two elements, he also sees the two elements;
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 (Believes(X,Fresh(el1)) _ Believes(X,Fresh(el2))
^ Sees(X,Conc(el1,el2)) =) Believes(X,Fresh(Conc(el1,el2))) - if
X believes that one of the elements in a concatenation is fresh, then he
believes that the concatenation is also fresh;
 Believes(X,Said(Y,Conc(el1,el2)))
=) Believes(X,Said(Y,el1)) ^ Believes(X,Said(Y,el2)) - if X be-
lieves that Y said the concatenation of two elements, then he also believes
that Y said both elements;
 Believes(X,Says(Y,Conc(el1,el2)))
=) Believes(X,Says(Y,el1)) ^ Believes(X,Says(Y,el2)) - if X be-
lieves that Y recently said the concatenation of two elements, then he also
believes that Y recently said both elements;
3.1.2.2 Cryptographic Rules
 Sees(X,Sign(el,PrivKey(Y))) ^ Sees(X,PubKey(Y))
=) Sees(X,el) ^ Believes(X,Said(Y,el)) - if X sees an element signed
with another principal's private-key and if X sees the correspondent public-
key then X can see the encrypted element and also knows who originally
sent it;
 Sees(X,Enc(el,PubKey(Y))) ^ Sees(X,PrivKey(Y))
=) Sees(X,el) - if X sees an element encrypted with another principal's
public-key and if X sees the correspondent private-key then X can see the
encrypted element. This happens when X and Y are the same principal
and that represents the case where X sees its own private-key. This rule
could also be applied in case the private-key was leaked or even shared.
Sharing a private-key is not the most common nor the best solution for
achieving delegation, but it is mentioned here and used in order to provide
a simple example of delegation;
 Sees(X,Enc(el,SharedKey k)) ^ Sees(X,SharedKey k) =) Sees(X,el)
- if X sees an element encrypted with a shared-key and if X sees that same
key then X can see the encrypted element;
3.1.2.3 Attacker Model Rules
All these rules contain also conditions to ensure the domain restriction. This is
done by enforcing that the elements that are in the left side of the implications
are part of one of the domains. In that way, we are able to prevent the innite
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concatenation or encryption of elements. Details on the implementation of the
domain restriction can be seen in Section 7.3.3.
 Sees(attacker,el1) ^ Sees(attacker,el2) =) Sees(attacker,Conc(el1,el2))
- if the attacker sees two elements, he is also able to build their concate-
nation;
 Sees(attacker,el) ^ Sees(attacker,PubKey(X))
=) Sees(attacker,Enc(el,PubKey(X))) - if the attacker sees an ele-
ment and a public-key, he can encrypt the element with that key;
 Sees(attacker,el) ^ Sees(attacker,PrivKey(X))
=) Sees(attacker,Sign(el,PrivKey(X))) - if the attacker sees an ele-
ment and a private-key, he can sign the element with that key;
 Sees(attacker,el) ^ Sees(attacker,SharedKey k)
=) Sees(attacker,Enc(el,SharedKey k)) - if the attacker sees an el-
ement and a shared-key, he can encrypt the element with that key;
 Sees(attacker,el) =)MsgSent(attacker,X,el) - the attacker can send
all the elements he sees to all the other principals;
3.2 The Underlying Engine
There are three parts that are used by the BAK tool to get the verication
result: the built-in core of system rules R and the two required inputs: the
model of the communication system (C) and the goal G that is veried by the
tool (the goal has one or more security properties P ). Having the model of the
communications system (C) and the set of system rules (R), the tool tests each
property P of the goal against the modeled communication system (C). The
dierent parts of the BAK tool are dened in Figure 3.2.
Where C is a set of assertions that model the communication system, R is the
set of inference rules that compose the core engine of the BAK tool, P is one of
the predicates that compose the security goal G. The values used might either
be variables (x) or constants (c), and predicate is one of the predicates presented
in Figure 3.1.
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System ::= C ^R ^G
C ::= ^i(Asserti)
R ::= AssertsA ) AssertsB
G ::= ^i((:)?Pi)
P ::= predicate(~c)
Asserts ::= Assert ^ ::: ^Assert
Assert ::= predicate( ~El)
El ::= xjc
Figure 3.2: BAK core assertions
3.2.1 Modeling and Verication with SMT
Having the model of the communication system C, then CR is all the knowledge
that one is able to infer from C using the inference rules R. A way of picturing
such a system is shown in Figure 3.3.
C
CR
Figure 3.3: The knowledge inferred by communication system C using R.
Regarding C, we want to verify whether or not the system satises a given
property P . In logic terms, this is stated as C ^ R ` P . Indeed, we need to
establish whether or not P is a logical consequence of the system, i.e., we need to
establish that any instance of the system satises P. In order to make it simpler
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to reason about the system, we require that P is an atomic positive assertion
that could be derived by R. More specically, P can either be a Believes(:),
used for verifying authentication, or a Sees(:), used for verifying condentiality.
Due to the way the system and the inference rules are designed, C ^R does not
contain any negative assertions. C^R can be seen as all the knowledge that can
be derived from the communication system C using the inference rules R that
contains the core engine of the BAK tool and which, as previously mentioned,
contain rules that model both the attacker knowledge and the beliefs of the
legitimate principals.
3.2.1.1 Verifying P in C ^R
We want to verify whether or not P is derived from C using R. That amounts
to verify if C ^ R ` P , which, in Figure 3.3, would be equivalent to verify that
P 2 CR.
One way of verifying if P is derived from C using R is by checking C ^R ^ :P
for satisability. If we have that
C ^R ^ :P is SAT
which means that there is a model of C ^R where :P holds,i.e.:
C ^R ^ :P is SAT  9m 2MC^R : m j= :P
then we know that P 62 CR (P is not inferred from C using R). We know this
because if it were the case that P 2 CR, the result would certainly be UNSAT,
since having P ^:P in a system would be a contradiction and would make the
system unsatisable. If we have that
C ^R ^ :P is UNSAT
which means that there is no model of C ^R where :P holds,i.e.:
C ^R ^ :P is UNSAT  8m 2MC^R : m 6j= :P
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then it could either be that P 2 CR (P is inferred from C using R) or that
the modeling of the system led to a domain over-restriction. Therefore, if one
wants to use the unsatisability result to prove that a property is derived from
C using R, then one has to argue that the unsatisability is not due to the
domain over-restriction.
It is worth noting that if one tries to check C ^ R ^ P for satisability, the
result will always be SAT due to the fact that, as previously discussed, C ^ R
only derive positive assertions. Therefore, this SAT result will not distinguish
between the case where P is derived from C using R from the case where P
simply does not contradict any of the assertions derived by C using R (such
contradiction would, in fact, never happen since C ^ R only contain positive
assertions).
C
CR
b b
P1 P2
Figure 3.4: Security properties in the system.
Summarizing for the system being used, there are two dierent ways of proving
security properties of the system, which are discussed bellow:
Proving that a property that models security is derived from C using
R. This is the case of P1 in Figure 3.4 and is related with reasoning about
legitimate principals beliefs. For this case, there is a proof that P1 is derived by
C ^R when C ^R^:P1 is unsatisable and it is shown that the unsatisability
result was not due to the over-restriction of the domain cause by the analysis
abstractions, i.e.:
(C ^R ^ :P1) is UNSAT d C ^R ` P1  P1 holds in system C
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where we have that d represents equivalence modulo domain-restriction, i.e.,
the equivalence exists over a specic size domain.
The domain size is relevant because if a limit is not set on the domain size, the
tool might not terminate. For example, the result of concatenating two elements
is another element. That concatenation element could then be concatenated
again, and this chain of concatenations could happen forever and the analysis
would, therefore, not terminate and that is why it is crucial to restrict the
domain. On the other hand, precautions have to be taken when over-restricting
the domain, i.e., for example, making the domain so small that the attacker
is not able to perform the concatenation of two elements that is needed to
perform an attack. Summarizing, the domain has to be limited so that the tool
terminates and at the same time has to be big enough to avoid inuencing the
outcome of the analysis. The way this domain restriction is implemented in the
BAK tool is detailed in Section 7.3.3.
Proving that a property that models the lack of security is not derived
from C and R. This is the case of P2 in Figure 3.4 and this kind of properties
is related with the reasoning about the attacker knowledge. In this case, we
have a proof that P2 is not derived by C ^ R when C ^ R ^ :P2 is satisable,
i.e.:
(C ^R ^ :P2) is SAT  C ^R 6` P2  P2 does not hold in system C
It is worth mentioning that Selinger [Sel03] developed an attacker-centric way
of verifying protocols using a similar system. In his work, since he is only
interested in reasoning about knowledge that might be derived by the attacker,
his P is the attack being analyzed in the system. As it was shown above, if
the result is SAT then one proves that the attack does not occur in the system.
Since Selinger's work is only aimed at proving that the attack does not occur,
assurances regarding the system that is being tested are only given when the
analyzed system is satisable and, therefore, there is no need to reason about
the domain restriction to defend the correctness of a protocol in that case.
3.2.1.2 Tool Outputs
When analyzing C^R^(:P ), the BAK tool does not only return the satisability
analysis but also provides extra information that helps understand and analyze
the obtained results. The kind of extra information will depend on whether the
analysis result is satisable or unsatisable.
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If the system and the goal being analyzed is satisable, then the tool also returns
the model that satises the assertions. On the other hand, if system is unsatis-
able, the tool returns the unsatisability core, i.e., a small set of assertions that
make the system unsatisable. This set is not guaranteed to be minimal but, in
my experience, generally provides useful information regarding the system and
the analysis result.
It is worth mentioning that extracting information from a satisable model is
not as simple as extracting information from the unsatisable core. This is the
case because the model tends to be complex and not easily readable. Analyzing
and interpreting this model and providing more useful feedback to the user is
part of future work.
3.3 The Modular Attacker
One of the the advantages of the BAK tool is the amount of exibility provided
for the modeling of the attacker capabilities. It is not only possible to directly
model its capabilities in terms of constructing/reading dierent elements, but
it is also simple to model whether or not the attacker is able to see the dierent
exchanged messages. For example, one can model that the attacker is able to
listen to the messages sent by Alice but not the ones sent by Bob. This can be
specially useful when modeling cyber-physical systems, where an attacker does
not always have access to the whole network. An example could be a situation
like the one in Figure 3.5, where the attacker's physical access is restricted.
attacker
b b
A B
b
Figure 3.5: Attacker with limited physical access to the network.
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In such a case, the standard rule:
MsgSent(X,Y,el) =) Sees(Y,el) ^ Sees(attacker,el)
Would be replaced by the following two rules:
MsgSent(A; Y; el) =) Sees(Y; el) ^ Sees(attacker; el)
MsgSent(B; Y; el) =) Sees(Y; el)
This way, it is modeled that the attacker can only see the messages sent by A
and not the ones sent by B.
As for the situation where the attacker is sending the messages, the standard
rule is the following:
Sees(attacker,el) =) MsgSent(attacker,Xi,el)
Which models the fact that the attacker is able to send all the elements he sees
to all the principals. In this example, he is only able to send messages to A and
not to B, so the rule is changed to the following rule:
Sees(attacker,el) =) MsgSent(attacker,A,el)
As intended, this rules denes that the attacker is only able to send messages
to A.
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Chapter 4
The Abstract Global Level
This level is the entry level for a system designer and its main goal is to provide
the designer with a language that is simple and intuitive to use, while having
the necessary tools to model the communication system under development.
4.1 The Language
As mentioned in Section 1.3.1, the modeling language at this level is similar to
the Alice and Bob notation. The language has, however, an important extension:
security modules. These security modules allow the developer to assign security
assurances to the message elements being exchanged. This, similarly to CaPiTo
(presented in Section 2.1.1), allows for the separation of concerns between the
required types of security for the dierent message elements and the way that
security is implemented.
The syntax of the language is shown is Figure 4.1. The system (system) is com-
posed by a sequence of statements (stm), each of them representing a message
(msg) being sent from one principal to another. A message is a sequence of
elements (el) that are either plain-text or security modules.
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system ::= stm; j system stm;
stm ::= principal! principal : msg
principal ::= string
msg ::= el j msg, el
el ::= string j secModule
secModule ::= secAssurance(msg)
secAssurance ::= Auth j StrongAuth j Conf j Sec j StrongSec
Figure 4.1: Syntax of the Abstract Global level language.
4.2 The Security Modules
As mentioned above, the most important elements in this level are the security
modules, which allow for the modeling of security assurances of the exchanged
data. Firstly, an explanation of the dierent security properties is given, then a
simple overview of dierent modules is shown in Table 4.1 and a more detailed
description of their semantics is given in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Authentication, Condentiality, and Security
Authentication is a highly discussed property not only in network security but
also in many other areas. There are, in fact, dierent notions of authentication,
mostly regarding its precise meaning and which exact security properties must
be veried in order to achieve authentication. Gollmann [Gol96] describes his
notion of authentication by having it composed by two parts: message origin
authentication and replay prevention. Having message origin authentication,
one is able to achieve what can be called strong authentication by adding a
mechanism that prevents replay attacks, i.e., a mechanism that does not allow
an attacker to impersonate the agent being authenticated by re-using the ex-
changed messages. This can be implemented by adding freshness guarantees to
the exchanged messages, for example, by using a time-stamp or a challenge sent
by the authenticator. Another way of dening authentication, similar to the
one provided by Gollmann, but renamed in a way that better aligns with the
rest of the work presented here, is:
Strong Authentication = Authentication+ Freshness Guarantees
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Mödersheim and Viganò [MV09b] also present a notion of authentication when
they introduce the security properties of dierent communication channels (in-
troduced in Section 2.4). In general terms, the authors' description of authenti-
cation is similar to Gollmann's description: what Mödersheim and Viganò call
authentication is what Gollmann calls message origin authentication and what
is called authentication in this work. As for Gollmann's authentication, Möder-
sheim and Viganò call it authentication with freshness and that is called strong
authentication in this work.
One important addition to authentication made by Mödersheim and Viganò is
the use of a receiver identier in the authenticated message. They argue [MV09c]
that authentication should also ensure that the authenticated message is in-
tended to a specic recipient. Adding the receiver identier to an authenticated
message has a very small cost and it aids on the prevention of replay attacks.
A simple example of that is that if there was a message exchange where Alice
is sending an authentic message m without adding the receiver identier:
A! B : fmgprivKey(A)
it would then be possible for a dishonest Bob to send that message to Carsten:
B ! C : fmgprivKey(A)
and that would result in Carsten thinking that he was receiving that message
directly from Alice.
If, on the other hand, we have Alice also sending the receiver identier together
with the message:
A! B : fB;mgprivKey(A)
then if Bob replays that message to Carsten:
B ! C : fB;mgprivKey(A)
Carsten will know that the message was indeed sent by Alice at some point but
not originally to him but to Bob.
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The compositionality of security modules (or channels) is investigated by Möder-
sheim and Viganò. They defend that compositionality might not preserve the
dierent security properties and they provide a set of restrictions under which
compositionality does preserve the security properties. The work presented here
does not deal directly with compositionality but, by having verication tools in
the concrete levels of the frameworks, it allows for the verication of the security
properties after the security modules are replaced by their implementations and,
therefore, with the composed implementation of the security modules.
Another simple mechanism, also mentioned by Mödersheim and Viganò, that
helps prevent possible compositionality issues and type-aw attacks is the us-
age of tags on the dierent messages. Having a tag that helps identifying the
original intent of a message prevents some cases where the attacker could replay
a message in a dierent context. This mechanism is a small cost to pay to add
some extra protection against type-aw attacks. Therefore, tags are also used
in the cryptographic implementation of the dierent modules in this project.
authTag (or aT for brevity) is used for authentication and confTag (or cT for
brevity) for condentiality. There is no tag for security because, as it will be
shown below, the implementation of the security module uses authentication
and condentiality.
Yet another important work on the denition of authentication and its properties
is given by Lowe [Low97]and it is also possible to describe the aforementioned
authentication and strong authentication with Lowe's denitions of authentica-
tion.
Authentication can be characterized as Lowe's non-injective agreement while
strong authentication as Lowe's (injective) agreement. What Lowe means by
injective and non-injective agreement is related with the communication being
susceptible to replay attacks. Injective agreement means that there is a one-to-
one correspondence between the initiation of the authentication communication
on the sender's side (the sending of an authenticated message) and the ending
of that communication on the receiver's side (the reception and interpretation
of the authenticated message). This means that no replay attacks can occur
in an injective agreement. In case replay attacks might occure, that amounts
to a correspondence of one-to-many, which is what Lowe calls non-injective
agreement.
Condentiality is a less controversial security property and there is a general
consensus on what it means: that only the intended receiver of the message
is able to read that message. In other words, when Alice sends a condential
message to Bob, she knows that only Bob is able to read that message and when
Bob receives that message, he also knows that he is the only one able to read
that message.
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As for security, it can be seen as the combination of authentication and con-
dentiality, i.e., when a secure message is sent from Alice to Bob, Bob knows
that Alice was the originator of the message and they both know that only Bob
can read the message. One can then have security or strong security depend-
ing on the used authentication variation: without or with freshness guarantees,
respectively.
The security modules, their informal meanings, and a possible cryptographic
implementation are shown in Table 4.1. A more formal description of the se-
curity modules is presented in Section 4.2.2. There are several possible ways of
implementing the security modules, but the chosen implementation uses cryp-
tographic mechanisms and a Public-Key Infrastructure, which enables the use
of cryptography with public-/private-key pairs. The main reasons behind this
choice are that it allows for a simple implementation with few exchanged mes-
sages and its simplicity also helps on further understanding the semantics of the
security modules.
It is worth noting the presence of N in the strong authentication and strong
security cryptographic implementations in Table 4.1. That N is used in a way
that guarantees the freshness of the message to the recipient (B) of the message.
That could be implemented by havingN being a time-stamp that B can verify or
by implementing an extra message exchange where B sends a freshly generated
element to A prior to the message sent from A to B and, therefore, B is be able
to check that the message is fresh since it contains the previously sent freshly
generated element. This possible implementation for the StrongAuth module is
shown bellow:
B ! A : N
A! B : faT;B;N;mgprivKey(A)
4.2.2 Semantics of the Security Modules
To dene the semantics of the security modules at the Abstract Global level,
the BAN logic was extended with a principal variable attacker, which is used
to represent am explicit attacker.
Before dening the semantics of the security modules, it is important to expand
on the use of integrity in GSD. Integrity can have dierent meanings depending
on the eld it is being used in, and can even have slightly dierent denitions
in the same eld. For this work, integrity is considered to mean that a message
is not corrupted over time or in transit [CHL+00].
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Security Description Cryptographic implementation
Modules
None represents
the case that
data is sent in
plain-text
A! B : m
Authentication data is trans-
mitted in a way
that allows the
receiver to iden-
tify the original
sender
A! B : faT;B;mgprivKey(A)
Strong similar to the
Authentication Authentication
module, but
also provides
freshness guar-
antees
A! B : faT;B;N;mgprivKey(A)
Condentiality data is trans-
mitted in a way
that only allows
the intended re-
ceiver to read it
A! B : fcT;mgpubKey(B)
Security conjugation
of the Weak
Authentica-
tion and the
Condentiality
modules
A! B : fcT; faT;B;mgprivKey(A)gpubKey(B)
Strong Secu-
rity
similar to the
Weak Security
module, but
also provides
freshness guar-
antees. It is a
conjugation of
the Authenti-
cation and the
Condentiality
modules
A! B : fcT; faT;B;N;mgprivKey(A)gpubKey(B)
Table 4.1: The Security Modules
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For message exchange, integrity is guaranteed when the contents of a message
cannot be changed in transit without changes being instantly obvious to the
recipient of that message. In the GSD framework, integrity is assumed in all
the messages that are exchanged. This can be implemented by, for example,
sending a signed digest of the message together with the full message. With
integrity, the following rule is present in the system:
X ! Y : m
Y sees m;
attacker sees m
Another important notation is represents. When having X represents Y , it
means that X is able to act as Y , i.e., to represent it. It means that X is
trusted by X or that acquired sucient private knowledge that enables them to
authenticate as X. This way of modeling the situation where principals are being
trusted and are allowed to represent other principals is similar to the one used
in the BAN logic. It is an elegant and simple solution that, at the same time,
gives the power and exibility for reasoning about delegation and trust issues.
In Section 7.3.4, a more detailed description of how this rule is implemented in
the GSD framework prototype is given.
It is also worth noting that in the security modules going to be presented now,
what is being considered the authentication of the message and not of the sender
of the message and that is the reason why the receiver identiers are not used
in these modules. In other words, we want to have assurances regarding which
principal said a message (i.e., the original sender of the message), but not assur-
ances regarding the last sender of the message (i.e., if an authenticated message
is forwarded by a principal, the assurances are still concerning the original sender
of the message and not concerning the principal who forwarded it).
4.2.2.1 Authentication
The rule for the authentication module specied that when a principal Z sees
Auth(X;w), then Z knows that the message was originally sent byX, but knows
nothing about the freshness of the message:
Z sees Auth(X;w)
Z believes X said w
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4.2.2.2 Strong Authentication
As previously mentioned, having authentication (Auth(X;w)) without any as-
surances in terms of freshness does not provide any guarantees regarding when
principal X sent the message and is, therefore, susceptible to replay attacks 
where a principal that got access to a message previously sent is able to resend
it. That is the reason for the existence of the strong authentication module
(called StrongAuth) that also provides freshness guarantees:
Z sees StrongAuth(X;w)
Z believes X said w;
Z believes fresh(w)
It is worth nothing the belief Z believes fresh(w). When implementing the
modules, one has to make sure that guarantees regarding freshness are imple-
mented, for example, using timestamps or exchange of nonces to provide that
freshness.
Having the following rule that models the inuence of freshness:
Z believes X said w; Z believes fresh(w)
Z believes X says w
the reasoning associated with the StrongAuth module can then be completed:
Z sees StrongAuth(X;w)
Z believes X said w;
Z believes fresh(w)
Z believes X says w
4.2.2.3 Condentiality
The rule for the Condentiality module species that a message that is con-
dential to Y can only be read by him, or by another principal that represents
Y :
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Z sees Conf(Y;w); Z represents Y
Z sees w
It is important to note that there are two situations where a principal (including
the attacker) is able to see w: if the principal has been previously authorized by
Y to represent him or if the attacker is able to derive sucient knowledge that
enables him to represent Y .
4.2.2.4 Security
Security can be seen as the conjugation between authentication and conden-
tiality. Therefore, its rule is the following:
Z sees Sec(X;Y;w); Z represents Y
Z sees w;
Z believes X said w
4.2.2.5 Strong Security
Similarly to the Authentication module, Sec(X;Y;w) does not provide any guar-
antees regarding when principal X sent the message and is also susceptible to
replay-attacks. That is why the security module StrongSec was created, to add
freshness guarantees to the security module:
Z sees StrongSec(X;Y;w); Z represents Y
Z sees w;
Z believes X said w;
Z believes fresh(w)
Z sees w;
Z believes X says w
Conjugation of modules. As previously mentioned, the security module is a
conjugation of authentication and condentiality:
X ! Y : Sec(m) , X ! Y : Conf(Auth(m))
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By looking at this composition of authentication and condentiality to obtain
security, one could ask why the modules are composed as Conf(Auth(m)) and
not as Auth(Conf(m)). The reason for this is that, if the composition is per-
formed as Auth(Conf(m)) then it would not provide the necessary beliefs for
a security module. It is possible to see that by looking at an example where X
sends to Y the message Auth(Conf(m)). Then Y sees Auth(A;Conf(B;m))
and the possible derived beliefs would be:
X ! Y : Auth(Conf(m))
Y sees Auth(X;Conf(Y;m))
Y believes X said Conf(Y;m)
Y represents Y
Y sees m;
Y believes X said Conf(Y;m)
And these beliefs are not the desired beliefs for a security module (as shown is
Section 4.2.2.4). In contrast to that, if the conjugation of the authentication
and the condentiality modules is done as Conf(Auth(m)), that results in the
following beliefs:
X ! Y : Conf(Auth(m))
Y sees Conf(Y;Auth(X;m));
Y represents Y
Y sees Auth(X;m)
Y sees m;
Y believes X said m
Which as one can see are the desired beliefs for a security module that are
shown is Section 4.2.2.4). The composition of the strong authentication and
condentiality is performed in a similar way in order to achieve the strong
security module.
4.2.3 The Contracts
Another important component of the GSD framework that is strongly connected
with the Abstract Global level is the use of contracts, which are attached to the
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security modules presented above and, therefore, model the outcome of using
the dierent security modules. One could say that contracts are the imple-
mentation of the security modules semantics presented above. This enables the
verication of the dierent implementations of the security modules by checking
that the security properties specied in the contracts are achieved by the used
implementations.
In other words, the contracts impose the beliefs that the principals must pos-
sess after running the implementation of the respective security module. The
contracts dene not only the beliefs of the principals after a normal run of the
modeled protocol, but also the beliefs of the attacker and what he is able to see.
More information regarding the implementation and usage of these contracts in
the GSD framework prototype is given in Chapter 7. Details of their use with
OFMC are given in Section 7.2.1, and details on their use in the BAK tool are
given in Section 7.3.1.
4.3 Abstract Global Level outputs
Even though the modeling language at this level is considerably abstract, it is
possible to perform some formal verication with OFMC already at this level.
That is advantageous since the earlier any security aws can be found in the
design phase, the less expensive they will be to correct.
4.3.1 The OFMC Analysis
The OFMC analysis at this level is possible due to the similarities between the
security modules and the channels used in the AnB language used by OFMC.
The model of the system described in language of the Abstract Global level is
translated into the AnB language, so that it can be veried by OFMC. The
translation is shown in Table 4.2. It is worth noting the use of nonces in the
cases of the StrongAuth and StrongSec. This happens because the current
version of OFMC (2012c) does not yet support the specication of the fresh au-
thentication and secure channels and, for that reason, the strong authentication
and strong security modules were implemented by introducing a nonce in the
authentication and secure channels, respectively. An alternative to the chosen
implementation could be to have the specication translated into AnBx [BM11],
which, as was mentioned in Section 2.4, allows the modeling of authentication
and secure channels with freshness guarantees and the translation from the se-
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curity modules to the AnBx channels could be performed directly, i.e., without
having to recur to nonces. AnBx could then be translated to AnB, which could
then be used with OFMC.
Using OFMC's analysis at this point of the system development does not provide
a great amount of information, since the system designer only specied the
desired security properties for the dierent messages, but it can be used as a
sanity check for the given system model, allowing the designer to conrm that
the communication system, and the security properties, were modeled correctly.
Security property Specication with Specication with
security modules channels
None A! B : msg A! B : msg
Auth A! B : Auth(msg) A  ! B : msg
StrongAuth A! B : StrongAuth(msg) B ! A : nonce
A  ! B : nonce;msg
Conf A! B : Conf(msg) A!  B : msg
Sec A! B : Sec(msg) A  !  B : msg
StrongSec A! B : StrongSec(msg) B ! A : nonce
A  !  B : nonce;msg
Table 4.2: Translation of security modules into AnB channels.
4.4 The Message Board
In the message board example, security modules are used to model the authenti-
cated message sent by the dierent users to the Message Board (MB) as shown
in Listing 4.1.
Al i c e ! MB : StrongAuth (msg1 ) ;
Bob ! MB : Conf (msg2 ) ;
Carsten ! MB : Sec (msg3 ) ;
Listing 4.1: Specication of the message board example.
The AnB code that is automatically generated from the specication of the sys-
tem presented in Listing 4.1 is shown in Listing 4.2. The goals are automatically
generated by using the contracts of the used security modules in the Abstract
Global level specication. More details regarding the generation of the goals are
given in Section 7.2.1.
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Protoco l : manual
Types :
Agent a l i c e , bob , cars ten , mb;
Number empty , . . . ;
Function pk . . .
Knowledge :
a l i c e : . . . ;
bob : . . . ;
c a r s t en : . . . ;
mb: . . .
Act ions :
mb ! a l i c e : N200
a l i c e ! mb : N200 , msg1
bob ! mb : msg2
ca r s t en ! mb : msg3
Goals :
mb au then t i c a t e s a l i c e on msg1
msg2 s e c r e t between bob ,mb
mb weakly au then t i c a t e s ca r s t en on msg3
msg3 s e c r e t between carsten ,mb
Listing 4.2: Specication of the exchanged messages from the message board
example.
In order to being able to use the automatically generated code (shown in List-
ing 4.2) with OFMC, one needs to manually provide some extra information:
the elements of the exchanged messages have to be declared in the Types section
and the initial knowledge of the dierent principals has to be modeled in the
Knowledge section. The last change that needs to be performed is the eventual
introduction of dummy messages (which by themselves are not relevant for the
system) in the Actions section in case the modeled communication is not per-
formed in a way that resembles the use of a communication system based on a
token. For example, that is not the case in the automatically generated code
shown in Listing 4.2 and that is why dummy messages were introduced, as it can
be seen in lines 14 and 16 of Listing 4.3. The added information could, in fact,
be automatically derived from the system model and it is part of future work in
the development of the GSD framework prototype, as mentioned in Section 9.1.
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1 Protoco l : manual
2 Types :
3 Agent a l i c e , bob , cars ten ,mb;
4 Number msg1 , msg2 , msg3 , N200 , authTag , confTag , empty ;
5 Function pk
6 Knowledge :
7 a l i c e : a l i c e , mb, inv ( pk ( a l i c e ) ) , msg1 , pk (mb) , authTag , confTag
;
8 bob : bob , mb, msg2 , pk (mb) , authTag , confTag ;
9 ca r s t en : cars ten , msg3 , inv ( pk ( ca r s t en ) ) , mb, pk (mb) , authTag ,
confTag ;
10 mb: mb, a l i c e , cars ten , inv ( pk (mb) ) , pk ( a l i c e ) , pk ( ca r s t en ) ,
authTag , confTag , empty
11 Actions :
12 mb ! a l i c e : N200
13 a l i c e ! mb : msg1
14 mb ! bob : empty
15 bob ! mb : msg2
16 mb ! ca r s t en : empty
17 ca r s t en ! mb : msg3
18 Goals :
19 mb authen t i c a t e s a l i c e on N200 , msg1
20 msg2 s e c r e t between bob ,mb
21 mb weakly au then t i c a t e s ca r s t en on msg3
22 msg3 s e c r e t between carsten ,mb
Listing 4.3: Completed specication of the exchanged messages from the
message board example.
The completed code is shown in Listing 4.3 and the result of the OFMC analysis
of that code is shown in Listing 4.4, which reports that no attack was found
(NO_ATTACK_FOUND). This means that the usage of the chosen security channels
for the message board example provide the required security properties for the
exchanged messages. There are, in fact, two results being displayed together, the
rst result (lines 1-11) for the default OFMC execution that performs a xed-
point analysis with unbounded number of sessions. The second result (lines 13-
27) is the output of running OMFC in the model-checking mode, where OFMC
performs a model-checking analysis of the system with a bounded number of
sessions. The GSD framework is currently requesting OFMC to check up to 4
sessions, so that the analysis does not take too long, but that number can be
set higher if ones wishes so. It is also worth noting that the description of the
goals specied in lines 7 and 19 are hard-coded in the tool output and do not
depend on the goals being checked.
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1 Result for de f au l t OFMC run :
2 % Open Source Fixedpoint Model Checker ve r s i on 2012 c
3 INPUT
4 tmp1243139937 .AnB
5 SUMMARY
6 NO_ATTACK_FOUND
7 GOAL: honest weak authen t i c a t i on and s e c r e cy
8 DETAILS
9 UNBOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS, TYPED_MODEL, FREE ALGEBRA
10 BACKEND OFMC
11 COMMENTS I t i s recommended to run with   c l a s s i c opt ion as we l l (
s e e manual ) .
12
13 Result for c l a s s i c OFMC run :
14 % Open Source Fixedpoint Model Checker ve r s i on 2012 c
15 INPUT
16 tmp1243139937 .AnB
17 SUMMARY
18 NO_ATTACK_FOUND
19 GOAL: as s p e c i f i e d
20 DETAILS
21 BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
22 BACKEND OFMC
23 STATISTICS
24 TIME 46 ms
25 parseTime 0 ms
26 v i s i t edNodes : 79 nodes
27 depth : 8 p l i e s
Listing 4.4: OFMC analysis result of the message board example.
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Chapter 5
The Concrete Global Level
The specication of the system at this level is more concrete (hence the level
name) than the specication in the Abstract Global level and it is obtained by
the automatic guided translation from the Abstract Global level that is described
in Section 5.1.
At the Concrete Global level, the GSD framework interfaces with the Beliefs and
Knowledge tool (Section 5.3.1) and OFMC (Section 5.3.2). Furthermore, as it
is shown in the use case in Chapter 8, when a system is already implemented
it can be specied directly at this level and veried by using the interface with
the verication tools.
5.1 Unfolding the Security Modules
To translate the system specication from the Abstract Global level to the Con-
crete Global level, the security modules present in the Abstract Global level
are unfolded. This unfolding is done by applying one of the dierent plugins
for each security module. These plugins represent implementations of the cor-
respondent security module using, for example, the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol, WS-Security (which adds security to the SOAP web services),
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or a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). As mentioned when introducing the con-
tracts in Section 4.2.3, it is possible to verify the chosen implementation for a
security module by checking that it satises the respective contract.
The syntax for this level is shown in Figure 5.1. As one can see, the syntax of this
level is similar to the one of the Abstract Global level with the main dierence
being the absence of the security modules and the addition of cryptographic
primitives that allow the modeling of the dierent implementation possibilities.
system ::= stm; j system stm;
stm ::= principal! principal : msg
principal ::= string
msg ::= el j msg, el
el ::= string j encModule j hash
hash ::= Hash(msg)
encModule ::= Enc(msg,key)
key ::= PrivKey(principal) j PubKey(principal) j SharedKey
Figure 5.1: Syntax of the Concrete Global level
5.1.1 The Plugins
The plugins are an important part of the Guided System Development frame-
work since they are used to implement the security modules.
A big advantage of the use of the plugins is the exibility they provide on
the choice of the implementations for each of the desired security properties,
i.e., the system designer is able to choose dierent implementations that are
guaranteed to achieve the security properties modeled in the system description
at the Abstract Global level. Another important advantage of the plugins is
that they enable a more dynamic approach to building secure systems since the
plugins make it simple to provide new implementations of the dierent security
properties or also implementations of new security properties. A brief overview
of possible security mechanisms and a suggestion of their implementation as
plugins is given in the sections below. These are to be viewed as suggestions
and they should be further investigated before being implemented, which is part
of future work.
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5.1.1.1 The PKI Plugin
A possible approach is to create a set of plugins that use a Public-Key In-
frastructure (PKI) to implement the dierent security modules. A Public-Key
Infrastructure uses Certicates and Certicate Authorities (CA) to bind the
public-key to a specic principal. That public-key is part of a key pair that
also contains a private-key, which is (usually) secret. This public-/private-key
pair has characteristics that make it useful when encrypting data: a message
encrypted with one of the keys can only be decrypted by using the other key
in the respective pair, which makes PKI useful for achieving authentication and
condentiality as it is shown bellow.
This approach provides a lightweight and simple message exchange with a small
overhead regarding the exchanged data.
The way to implement the dierent security modules (shown in Table 4.1) is
summarized here in Figure 5.2.
 Authentication: authentication tag, receiver's id, and message are en-
crypted with sender's private key;
 Strong Authentication: authentication tag, receiver's id, message, and
fresh element are encrypted with sender's private key;
 Condentiality: condentiality tag and message are encrypted with the
receiver's public key;
 Security: authentication tag, receiver's id, and message are encrypted with
sender's private key and then encrypted (together with the condentiality
tag) with receiver's public key;
 Strong Security: authentication tag, receiver's id, message, and fresh ele-
ment are encrypted with sender's private key and then encrypted (together
with the condentiality tag) with receiver's public key;
Figure 5.2: Description of the PKI plugin.
The actual implementation of the dierent modules using PKI is shown in Fig-
ure 5.3. In this implementation, an encryption scheme that supports private-key
encryption as a method of sign as message is used. A encryption scheme that
allows that is, for example, RSA [RSA78].
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 Authentication: A! B : faT;B;mgprivKey(A)
 Strong Authentication: A! B : faT;B;N;mgprivKey(A)
 Condentiality: A! B : fcT;mgpubKey(B)
 Security: A! B : fcT; faT;B;mgprivKey(A)gpubKey(B)
 Strong Security: A! B : fcT; faT;B;N;mgprivKey(A)gpubKey(B)
Figure 5.3: Implementation of the security modules with PKI.
5.1.1.2 The Transport Layer Security Protocol
The Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS) [DR08] is one of the most com-
monly used security protocol on the Internet. It allows for the establishment of
a secure connection between the client and the server also using a Public-Key
Infrastructure (PKI). TLS has two main modes that determine the characteris-
tics of the connection. One mode is called TLS with server side authentication,
where only the server is authenticated by sending its credentials when establish-
ing the connection, and the other mode is called TLS with mutual authentication,
where both the client and the server are authenticated using their own PKI cre-
dentials when establishing the connection. The authentication is performed by
verifying that the public-/private-key pair used in the communication belongs
to the intended entity. That is done by having Certicate Authorities (CA)
issue certicates for the public-key of those key pairs.
A common practice in the Internet is to use TLS only with server side authenti-
cation and, after establishing the connection, having the client authenticate with
the server by transmitting its username and password. The implementation of
the security modules with TLS are shown in Figure 5.4.
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 Authentication: not available with TLS;
 Strong Authentication: not available with TLS;
 Condentiality: TLS with server side authentication - since after setting
this communication channel there are guarantees regarding the server's
identity, the information sent by the client can only be read by the server
(i.e., the intended recipient);
 Security: not available with TLS;
 Strong Security: TLS with mutual authentication - in this communication
channel, the identities of the client and the server are guaranteed and,
therefore, the information sent over the channel can only be read by the
server (i.e., the intended recipient) and it has assurances regarding the
sender of the information;
Figure 5.4: Suggestion for implementing the plugins with TLS.
5.1.1.3 WS-Security
WS-Security [NKHBM04] is an end-to-end solution to add security to the SOAP
web services. It does so not by proposing new security methods and techniques
but by leveraging current security technology and describing how to apply the
latter to the SOAP web services in order to achieve the required security prop-
erties, i.e., WS-Security is a framework to embed existing security mechanisms
into a SOAP message in a way that is independent from the used transport
technology.
WS-Security addresses message authentication (with freshness guarantees), mes-
sage integrity (using digital signatures) and message encryption. A possible
implementation of the plugins using these mechanisms is shown in Figure 5.5.
68 The Concrete Global Level
 Authentication: not available with WS-Security;
 Strong Authentication: WS-Security with message authentication - the
message authentication provides assurances regarding the identity of the
sender of the message;
 Condentiality: WS-Security with message encryption - the message en-
cryption provides assurances regarding who can read the message;
 Security: not available with WS-Security;
 Strong Security: WS-Security with message authentication and encryption
- the message authentication and encryption provide assurances regarding
the assurances regarding the identity of the sender and regarding who is
able to read the message;
Figure 5.5: Suggestion for implementing the plugins with WS-Security.
5.1.1.4 IPSEC
IPsec [KS05] is a suite of protocols for securing network connections that oper-
ates in a lower layer of the TCP/IP model, i.e., in the Internet Layer. It has an
extensive list of settings and part of it is shown below:
 AH vs ESP
 AH - provides sender authentication and message integrity;
 ESP - provides sender authentication, encryption, and message in-
tegrity;
 Tunnel Mode vs Transport Mode
 Tunnel Mode - in this mode, the entire IP packet is encapsulated;
 Transport Mode - in this mode, only the IP payload is encapsulated;
 Encryption schemes options
 DES, 3DES, and AES among others;
 Hashing schemes options
 MD5 and SHA-1 among others;
 IKE vs manual keys
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 It is possible to choose how the required keys are distributed prior to
IPsec;
 Main mode vs Aggressive mode
 Main mode
 This mode is more secure and six messages (packets) are ex-
changed;
 Aggressive mode
 This mode is more time ecient but less secure, since only three
messages (packets) being exchanged with some information being
sent in plain-text;
Having these settings in consideration, a possible implementation of the plugins
with IPsec is shown in Figure 5.6.
 Authentication: not available with IPsec;
 Strong Authentication: IPsec with AH mode - as shown above, AH mode
provides message authentication, i.e., guarantees regarding the identity of
the sender;
 Condentiality: not available with IPsec;
 Security: not available with IPsec;
 Strong Security: IPsec with ESP mode - as shown above, ESP mode
provides sender authentication and encryption, which gives guarantees
regarding the identity of the sender and regarding who is able to see the
message;
Figure 5.6: Suggestion for implementing the plugins with IPsec
5.2 The Message Board
For our example system, the modules could be implemented with several of the
plugins presented above, but below we show the implementation of the modules
with the PKI plugin that was implemented in the prototype tool.
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5.2.1 Using PKI
The result of applying the PKI plugin to the message board example is shown
in Listing 5.1.
MB ! Al i c e : N200 ;
A l i c e ! MB : Enc ( ( authTag , MB, N200 , msg1 ) , PrivKey ( A l i c e ) ) ;
Bob ! MB : Enc ( ( confTag , msg2 ) , PubKey(MB) ) ;
Carsten ! MB : Enc ( ( confTag , Enc ( ( authTag , MB, msg3 ) , PrivKey (
Carsten ) ) ) , PubKey(MB) ) ;
Listing 5.1: The implementation of the message board example using the PKI
infrastructure.
5.3 Concrete Global Level Outputs
In this section, the formal methods tools that GSD currently interfaces with at
the Concrete Global Level are presented. As mentioned when presenting the
Beliefs and Knowledge (BAK) tool in Section 3, the BAK tool was developed
specically for the GSD framework and the frameworks connects with it from
this level. In addition, the GSD framework also connects with OFMC from this
level.
5.3.1 The BAK tool Analysis
Listing 5.2 shows the model of the the message board example implemented
with PKI (as shown in Listing 5.1) in SMT-LIB2, a standard format accepted
as input by several SMT solvers, including Z3, the engine used by the BAK tool.
( a s s e r t ( Be l i e v e s MB ( Fresh N200) ) )
( a s s e r t (MsgSent MB Al i c e N200 ) )
( a s s e r t (MsgSent A l i c e MB (PubKeySign authTag (Conc N200 msg1 ) (
PrivKey Al i c e ) ) ) )
( a s s e r t (MsgSent Bob MB (PubKeyEnc confTag msg2 ) (PubKey MB) ) )
( a s s e r t (MsgSent Carsten MB (PubKeyEnc confTag ( ( PubKeySign authTag
msg3 ) ( PrivKey Carsten ) ) (PubKey MB) ) ) )
Listing 5.2: An authenticated message of the example system modeled in
SMT-LIB2.
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The result of applying dierent tests to the model of the example system is shown
in Table 5.1. These goals are the contracts of the dierent security modules as
explained in Section 7.3.1.
Test Result Result Interpretation
not (Believes MB (Says Alice msg1)) unsat MB believes that Alice
recently said msg1
not (Sees MB msg2) unsat Mb sees msg2
not (Sees attacker msg2) sat attacker does not see
msg2
not (Believes MB (Said Carsten msg3)) unsat MB believes that
Carsten said msg3 at
some point
not (Sees Mb msg3) unsat MB sees msg3
not (Sees attacker msg3) sat attacker does not see
msg3
Table 5.1: Output of the BAK tool for the example system.
In Table 5.1, only the sat/unsat result is shown, but the BAK tool does re-
turn more information. For example, the complete result of testing the two
goals related with msg2  second and third line of Listing 5.1  is shown
in Listing 5.3. The rst line tells us that the system model together with the
rst negated goal is unsatisable, which means that the property without the
negation holds, fact that is mentioned in the Result Interpretation column of
Table 5.1. The second line of the output is the unsatisability core returned by
Z3. It displays the names of the rules and assertions that are used to arrive at
one unsatisability core (not necessarily the minimal one). This result tells us
that MB sees msg2 because of a message that was sent (msgSent) and because
he was able to decrypt that message (decOfPubKeyEnc) due to the fact that it
knows its own private-key (MBseesItsPrivKey). Therefore, we know that MB
received a message, decrypted it with its private-key which allowed him to see
msg2. Line 3 of Listing 5.3 shows the result for the second test related with
msg2. It would also be possible to show a satisable model, but it was left out
due to its size. An interesting possibility for future work is the extraction of
information from that satisable model.
unsat
(MBseesItsPrivKey msgSent decOfPubKeyEnc )
sa t
Listing 5.3: Complete output of the BAK tool for one of the tests from
example system.
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5.3.2 The OFMC Analysis
In Listing 5.4, the automatically generated output of AnB code from the Con-
crete Global level is shown. It is the skeleton of the le used as input to OFMC.
As mentioned in Section 4.4, the goals in Listing 5.4 are automatically generated
by using the contracts of the used security modules in the Abstract Global level
specication. More details are given in Section 7.2.1.
It is also worth noting that, both in here and in the AnB code generated from
the Abstract Global level (Section 4.4), the names of the principals are in lower
case. That is an important detail, since OFMC considers principals whose
name starts in lower case as honest principals and in capital case as dishonest
principals. The main reason for the decision of having the principals in lower
case, and therefore honest principals, is that not much information can be taken
from checking a message for condentiality when the principal that is sending
that message encrypted in a way that would preserve condentiality can also act
dishonestly and send that same message in plain-text. Having the principals in
capital case, specially when verifying authentication properties is, however, an
interesting possibility and would, therefore, be an interesting subject of future
work.
Protoco l : manual
Types :
Agent a l i c e , bob , cars ten , mb;
Number empty , . . . ;
Function pk . . .
Knowledge :
a l i c e : . . . ;
bob : . . . ;
c a r s t en : . . . ;
mb: . . .
Act ions :
mb ! a l i c e : N200
a l i c e ! mb : {authTag ,MB, N200 , msg1} inv ( pk ( a l i c e ) )
bob ! mb : {confTag , msg2}pk (mb)
ca r s t en ! mb : {confTag , { authTag ,MB,msg3} inv ( pk ( ca r s t en ) ) }pk (mb)
Goals :
mb authen t i c a t e s a l i c e on msg1
msg2 s e c r e t between bob ,mb
mb weakly au then t i c a t e s ca r s t en on msg3
msg3 s e c r e t between carsten ,mb
Listing 5.4: The automatically generated AnB code of message board example.
In Listing 5.5 one can see the complete AnB le that is used as input to OFMC.
In this case, one needs to add in section Types the declaration of the messages
being exchanged (present in line 4) and the used functions in line 5, and in
section Knowledge the initial knowledge of the principals (modeled in lines 7
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to 10). Furthermore, and also as mentioned in Section 4.4, one also needs to
introduce dummy messages in the Actions section. Most of this information
can be extracted from the system model present in the GSD framework. That
is, in fact, planned for future work on the further development of the framework
prototype.
1 Protoco l : manual
2 Types :
3 Agent a l i c e , bob , cars ten ,mb;
4 Number msg1 , msg2 , msg3 , N200 , authTag , confTag , empty ;
5 Function pk
6 Knowledge :
7 a l i c e : a l i c e , mb, inv ( pk ( a l i c e ) ) , msg1 , pk (mb) , authTag , confTag ;
8 bob : bob , mb, msg2 , pk (mb) , authTag , confTag ;
9 ca r s t en : cars ten , msg3 , inv ( pk ( ca r s t en ) ) , mb, pk (mb) , authTag ,
confTag ;
10 mb: mb, a l i c e , cars ten , inv ( pk (mb) ) , pk ( a l i c e ) , pk ( ca r s t en ) ,
authTag , confTag , empty
11 Actions :
12 mb ! a l i c e : N200
13 a l i c e ! mb : {authTag ,mb, N200 , msg1} inv ( pk ( a l i c e ) )
14 mb ! bob : empty
15 bob ! mb : {confTag , bob ,mb, msg2}pk (mb)
16 mb ! ca r s t en : empty
17 ca r s t en  > mb : {confTag , { authTag ,mb, msg3} inv ( pk ( ca r s t en ) ) }pk (mb)
18 Goals :
19 mb authen t i c a t e s a l i c e on N200 , msg1
20 msg2 s e c r e t between bob ,mb
21 mb weakly au then t i c a t e s ca r s t en on msg3
22 msg3 s e c r e t between carsten ,mb
Listing 5.5: The automatically generated AnB code for the example with the
added information
And, nally, the result of the analysis is shown in Listing 5.6. It tells us that
the modeled communication system veries the specied goals, i.e., that the
implementation of the security modules verify their contracts, not just each
security modules individually, but also composition of the dierent exchanged
modules.
As with the OFMC analysis result from the Abstract Global level, there are
two results being displayed together: the OFMC xed-point analysis with un-
bounded number of sessions and the OFMC model-checking analysis of the
system with a bounded number of sessions. The GSD framework is currently
requesting OFMC to check up to 4 sessions, so that the analysis does not take
too long, but that number can be set higher if ones wishes so.
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Result for de f au l t OFMC run :
% Open Source Fixedpoint Model Checker ve r s i on 2012 c
Ve r i f i e d for 1 s e s s i o n s
INPUT
tmp2069860803 .AnB
SUMMARY
NO_ATTACK_FOUND
GOAL: honest weak authen t i c a t i on and s e c r e cy
DETAILS
UNBOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS, TYPED_MODEL, FREE ALGEBRA
BACKEND OFMC
COMMENTS I t i s recommended to run with   c l a s s i c opt ion as we l l (
s e e manual ) .
Result for c l a s s i c OFMC run :
% Open Source Fixedpoint Model Checker ve r s i on 2012 c
INPUT
tmp2069860803 .AnB
SUMMARY
NO_ATTACK_FOUND
GOAL: as s p e c i f i e d
DETAILS
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
BACKEND OFMC
STATISTICS
TIME 405 ms
parseTime 0 ms
v i s i t edNodes : 532 nodes
depth : 13 p l i e s
Listing 5.6: OFMC analysis results.
Chapter 6
The Concrete Endpoint
Level
The system specication at this level results from splitting the global view of
the system into the views of the dierent principals in the specied system. This
makes the system specication closer to code and also to some verication tools,
such as LySatool (presented in Section 2.5.1). The global view is split into the
views of the dierent principals using Endpoint Projection, which is described
below.
6.1 Endpoint Projection
In order to translate from the Concrete Global level to the Concrete Endpoint
level, an endpoint projection is applied. This technique extracts the views of the
dierent principals present in a specication of the global view of the system.
Carbone et al. [CHY07] present the endpoint projection that they use to trans-
late a web-service description of a system in W3C Web Services Choreography
Description Language (WS-CDL) [W3C05]  an XML-based language that de-
nes the global behavior of the principals in the system  into applied typed
-calculus.
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It is simple to extract the specication of the actions of the sender of the mes-
sage from the global description of the system because the description of the
exchanged message is given from the point of the view of the sender: which
elements are being sent and which (if any) encryptions are being performed.
For that reason, the result of the endpoint projection for the side of the sender
of the message is similar to the specication of the message in the global view
of the system.
On the other hand, extracting the specication of the actions of the receiver
of the message is a more complex task due to the properties of the modeling
language. A modeling language in the style of Alice and Bob lacks a way of
specifying the receiver actions and this makes the endpoint projection process
harder to perform. This happens because, as mentioned, no information is
explicitly modeled in the global view of the system regarding the actions of
the receiver of the message, in particular, regarding how the message should be
deconstructed, which elements are to be compared with values previously know
to the receiver, which values are to be assigned to new variables and which ones
are to be decrypted (and the same applies to the information that results from
the performed decryptions). Since the structure of the messages specication in
the Concrete Global specication is dened in the translation from the Abstract
Global level to the Concrete Global level  in the GSD framework prototype
with the use of PKI  it is possible to infer the needed information described
above in order to derive the required information for specifying the actions of
the receiver of a message. Nonetheless, allowing for the possibility of describing
receiver actions in the Abstract Global level specication as extra notation could
be an interesting line of future research to extend the GSD framework.
The endpoint projection in the GSD framework prototype is performed by going
through the system specication at the Concrete Global level and, for each of
the actions in the model, generating the correspondent actions performed by
the dierent principals. For example, a message being sent from A to B in
the Concrete Global level is projected to the independent specication of the
correspondent actions of A and B, i.e., A would send the message and B would
receive it, parse it, and decrypt if necessary.
6.2 Concrete Endpoint Level
The syntax for this level is shown in Figure 6.1. It has some similarities with
the syntax of the language at the Concrete Global level but the main dierence
results from the dierent perspectives of the system in the two levels. The
system (system) in the Concrete Endpoint level is composed by the sequence of
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actions that are performed by the dierent principals, since the actions at this
level do not describe the global view of the system, but the sequence of actions
that are performed by each of the principals individually. These actions are
either the sending or the receiving and further processing (eventually decrypting,
comparing, and assigning elements) of the messages. The latter contain the same
elements as the ones in the Concrete Global level, i.e., either plain-text elements
or the encryption of elements.
system ::= principal: actions j system principal: actions
principal ::= string
actions ::= action; j actions, action;
action ::= sendMsg j receiveMsg j createFresh
createFresh ::= Create fresh value: string
sendMsg ::= Send message msg to principal
receiveMsg ::= Receive message string from principal (processMsg)?
processMsg ::= decrypt (compare)? assign
decrypt ::= Decrypt string with key
compare ::= Compare beginning of string with string
assign ::= Assign remainder of string to string
msg ::= el j msg, el
el ::= string j encModulej hash
hash ::= Hash(msg)
encModule ::= encryptionType(msg;key)
encryptionType ::= shEncryption j pubEncryption
key ::= PrivKey(principal) j PubKey(principal) j SharedKey
Figure 6.1: Syntax of the Concrete Endpoint level
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6.3 The Message Board
The model of our message board example at this level is shown in Listing 6.1.
                 Pr in c i pa l A l i c e                 
Receive message N200 from MB;
Send message pubEncryption ( "authTag , MB, N200 , msg1" , PrivKey ( A l i c e
) ) to MB;
                 Pr in c i pa l Bob                 
Send message pubEncryption ( "confTag , msg2" , PubKey(MB) ) to MB;
                 Pr in c i pa l Carsten                 
Send message pubEncryption ( "confTag , pubEncryption ( "authTag , MB,
msg3" , PrivKey ( Carsten ) ) " , PubKey(MB) ) to MB;
                 Pr in c i pa l MB                 
Create f r e s h value : N200 ;
Send message N200 to A l i c e ;
Receive message x833 from Al i c e ;
Decrypt x833 with PubKey( A l i c e )
Compare beg inning o f x833 to "authTag ,MB, N200"
Assign remainder o f x833 to msg1
Receive message x863 from Bob ;
Decrypt x863 with PrivKey (MB)
Compare beg inning o f x863 to "confTag"
Assign remainder o f x863 to msg2
Receive message x454 from Carsten ;
Decrypt x454 with PrivKey (MB)
Compare beg inning o f x454 to "confTag"
Assign remainder o f x454 to x190
Decrypt x190 with PubKey( Carsten )
Compare beg inning o f x190 to "authTag ,MB"
Assign remainder o f x190 to msg3
Listing 6.1: The messages from the system in the Concrete Endpoint level.
6.4 Concrete Endpoint Level Outputs
At this level, the GSD framework connects with LySatool and it also outputs
the code implementation of the modeled system.
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6.4.1 The LySatool Analysis
As presented in Section 2.5.1, LySatool [Buc05] performs security analysis of
protocols described in LySa [BBD+05]. The LySa code that is automatically
generated by the GSD framework prototype is shown in Listing 6.2.
1 (new +  KAlice )
2 ( Al ice ,MB; N200 ) .
3 <Alice ,MB, { | authTag ,MB, N200 , msg1 | } : KAlice >.
4 0
5 |
6 (new +  KBob)
7 <Bob ,MB, { | confTag , msg2 | } :KMB+>.
8 0
9 |
10 (new +  KCarsten )
11 <Carsten ,MB, { | confTag , { | authTag ,MB,msg3 | } : KCarsten  |} :KMB+>.
12 0
13 |
14 (new +  KMB)
15 (new N200)
16 <MB, Al ice , N200>.
17 (MB, Al i c e ; x339 ) .
18 decrypt x339 as { | authTag ,MB, N200 ; msg1 | } : KAlice+ in
19 (MB,Bob ; x253 ) .
20 decrypt x253 as { | confTag ; msg2 | } :KMB  in
21 (MB, Carsten ; x513 ) .
22 decrypt x513 as { | confTag ; x439 | } :KMB  in
23 decrypt x439 as { | authTag ,MB;msg3 | } : KCarsten+ in
24 0
Listing 6.2: The automatically generated LySa code of the example system.
Having the automatically output LySa code, there are two dierent pieces of
information that have to be added manually before the LySatool can be exe-
cuted. Those are the so called cryptopoints and also the declaration of freshly
generated elements. The completed code is shown in Listing 6.3. The crypto-
points are modeled inside square brackets (rst seen in the end of line 4) and
provide the necessary information to LySatool regarding where the encrypted
elements are supposed to be decrypted and also regarding where the decrypted
elements should have been encrypted originally. For example, the cryptopoint
in line 4 models the fact that the encryption can either be decrypted at desti-
nation b (which can be seen in line 21) or at destination CPDY, which models
the attacker. The cryptopoint models that the message can be decrypted by
the attacker because it is in fact a message signed by Alice and can therefore
be decrypted using her public-key, which the attacker has access to. Another
example is the cryptopoint in line 23, which models that the encryption of the
decrypted message should have been done either at cryptopoint c (in line 9) or
at cryptopoint CPDY. The message could have been encrypted by the attacker
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because it is a message encrypted with MB's public-key, which the attacker also
has access to.
The other added piece of information is the declaration of freshly generated
elements. The rst one can be seen in line 3. These declarations have to be
specied because otherwise the messages would be interpreted by LySatool as
being known by everyone, including the attacker, which would invalidate the
condentiality analysis of the system.
These two pieces of information can, in fact, be extracted automatically from
the system model present in the GSD framework and that is part of future work,
as mentioned in Section 9.1.
1 (new +  KAlice )
2 ( Al ice ,MB; N200 ) .
3 (new msg1 )
4 <Alice ,MB, { | authTag ,MB, N200 , msg1 | } : KAlice  [ at a des t {b ,CPDY}] >.
5 0
6 |
7 (new +  KBob)
8 (new msg2 )
9 <Bob ,MB, { | confTag , msg2 | } :KMB+ [ at c des t {d } ] >.
10 0
11 |
12 (new +  KCarsten )
13 (new msg3 )
14 <Carsten ,MB, { | confTag , { | authTag ,MB,msg3 | } : KCarsten  [ at g des t {h ,
CPDY} ] | } :KMB+ [ at e des t { f }] >.
15 0
16 |
17 (new +  KMB)
18 (new N200)
19 <MB, Al ice , N200>.
20 (MB, A l i c e ; x3 ) .
21 decrypt x3 as { | authTag ,MB, N200 ; msg1 | } : KAlice+ [ at b o r i g {a } ] in
22 (MB,Bob ; x313 ) .
23 decrypt x313 as { | confTag ; msg2 | } :KMB  [ at d o r i g {c ,CPDY} ] in
24 (MB, Carsten ; x468 ) .
25 decrypt x468 as { | confTag ; x547 | } :KMB  [ at f o r i g {e ,CPDY} ] in
26 decrypt x547 as { | authTag ,MB;msg3 | } : KCarsten+ [ at h o r i g {g } ] in
27 0
Listing 6.3: The completed LySa code of the example system.
Using the code from Listing 6.2 as input to LySatool, the obtained result is
shown in Figure 6.2. There is a big amount of information in this result from
LySatool, but the most important are the two rst elds: Values that may not
be condential and Violation of authentication properties. The former, as the
name indicates, displays the set of data that might not be condential after the
protocol run and, in this case, it is important to see that neither msg2 nor msg3
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are in that set, which is the intention since they are transmitted, respectively,
in a condential and secure way.
LySatool result: Values that may not be confidential 
N200, n•, m•+, m•-, KMB+, Alice, KAlice+, Bob, Carsten, confTag, KCarsten+, authTag, MB,
{|LauthTag, LMB, l•, Lmsg1|}LKAlice- [at a dest { b, CPDY }], {|LconfTag, L33|}LKMB+ [at e dest { f }],
{|LconfTag, Lmsg2|}LKMB+ [at c dest { d }], {|l•, l•, l•|}l• [at CPDY], {|l•, l•|}l• [at CPDY], {|l•, l•, l•, l•|}l•
[at CPDY], msg1
Violation of authentication properties (ψ) 
(e, d), (c, f)
Variable bindings (ρ)
ρ(x•) = LN200, l•, L13, LAlice, LMB, LCarsten, L36, LBob, L22, LauthTag, Lmsg1
ρ(msg1) = Lmsg1
ρ(msg2) = L33, Lmsg2, l•
ρ(msg3) = Lmsg3
ρ(x547) = L33, Lmsg2, l•
Messages communicated (κ)
<LAlice, LMB, L13>, <l•, l•, l•>, <LMB, LAlice, LN200>, <LCarsten, LMB, L36>, <LBob, LMB, L22>,
<l•>
Tree grammars (γ)
l•→ N200, n•, m•+, m•-, KMB+, Alice, KAlice+, Bob, Carsten, confTag, KCarsten+, authTag, MB,
{|LauthTag, LMB, l•, Lmsg1|}LKAlice- [at a dest { b, CPDY }], {|LconfTag, L33|}LKMB+ [at e dest {
f }], {|LconfTag, Lmsg2|}LKMB+ [at c dest { d }], {|l•, l•, l•|}l• [at CPDY], {|l•, l•|}l• [at CPDY], {|l•,
l•, l•, l•|}l• [at CPDY], msg1
LKMB+ → KMB+
LKAlice+→ KAlice+
LKMB-→ KMB-
LKCarsten+ → KCarsten+
LKAlice-→ KAlice-
LKCarsten-→ KCarsten-
L13→ {|LauthTag, LMB, l•, Lmsg1|}LKAlice- [at a dest { b, CPDY }]
L22→ {|LconfTag, Lmsg2|}LKMB+ [at c dest { d }]
L33→ {|LauthTag, LMB, Lmsg3|}LKCarsten- [at g dest { h, CPDY }]
L36→ {|LconfTag, L33|}LKMB+ [at e dest { f }]
LMB→MB
LBob→ Bob
LN200→ N200
Lmsg1→ msg1
Lmsg2→ msg2
Lmsg3→ msg3
Lx547→ {|LauthTag, LMB, Lmsg3|}LKCarsten- [at g dest { h, CPDY }], msg2, msg1, {|l•, l•, l•|}l• [at
Figure 6.2: Output from LySatool
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The other important eld, Violation of authentication properties, tells us that
there are two violations possibles, denoted by (e,d) and (c,f). Regarding
(e,d), by looking at the code being analyzed by LySatool (Listing 6.3), one
can see that cryptopoint e corresponds to the message being sent on line 14 (of
Listing 6.2) by Carsten can be received and decrypted by MB on line 23, which
is modeling the message that MB received from Bob. This result denotes a replay
attack where MB would accept and decrypt the message from Carsten as if it
was from Bob. Although, it is worth noting that the result of that decryption
would be an encrypted element and not a humanly-readable message, as MB was
expecting. As for the other violation, (c,f) represents an attack where MB would
receive and decrypt a message (in line 25) from Bob as if it was from Carsten.
The main dierence from this violation to the previous one is that MB further
decrypts the message (in line 26) and would notice that an attack was being
done there, since the decryption would not work. This happens because the rst
violation is related with the reception of a condential message while the second
violation is related with the reception of an secure message. Overall, this is an
interesting result that results from the compositionality of security modules and
it highlights why it is still useful to perform analysis of the security properties
after implementing the security modules.
6.4.2 The Code Output
The GSD framework outputs the system model to code by replacing the dierent
elements of the Concrete Endpoint specication with pre-determined Java blocks
of code that implement those elements. Furthermore, each of those blocks also
makes use of a Java library for functions such as encryption, decryption, and
generation of nonces.
The translation outputs Java code for each of the modeled principals individu-
ally. In Listing 6.4, the Java code for Alice in the message board running ex-
ample is shown. The code for the Message Board (MB) is shown in Listing 6.5.
The automatically generated code is the skeleton for the communication part of
system. This skeleton can then be used in the programs of each of the principals
to perform the communications. The code uses functions from a developed Java
library, adapted from my Master Thesis work [Qua10], which contains functions
for encryption and decryption of elements, generation of unique values, and
connection establishment. The code for this library is shown in Appendix A.1.
The output code for Bob and Carsten is not shown here since, except for the
absence of the nonce and the dierent encrypted elements, it is similar to the
output code of Alice.
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Part of future work for the further development of the GSD framework tool
prototype is to generate not just the communication skeleton but java programs
that can be compiled and executed.
1 /START RECEIVE MSG/
2 i f ( ! ( sockMB . isBound ( ) ) ) {
3 sockMB = makeConnection ( Al ice , MB, myPortMB, addressOfMB ,
portOfMB) ;
4 outMB = new PrintWriter ( sockMB . getOutputStream ( ) , true ) ;
5 inMB = new BufferedReader (new InputStreamReader (sockMB .
getInputStream ( ) ) ) ;
6 }
7
8 St r ing N200 = "" ;
9 inputLine = inMB . readLine ( ) ;
10 N200=inputLine+' \n ' ;
11
12 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Received msg from MB: " +N200) ;
13 /FINISH RECEIVE MSG/
14
15 /START SEND MSG/
16 i f ( ! ( sockMB . isBound ( ) ) ) { sockMB = makeConnection ( Al ice , MB,
myPortMB, addressOfMB , portOfMB) ;
17 outMB = new PrintWriter ( sockMB . getOutputStream ( ) , true ) ;
18 inMB = new BufferedReader (new InputStreamReader (sockMB .
getInputStream ( ) ) ) ;
19 }
20
21 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Sending msg to MB: pubEncryption ( "authTag ,MB, "
+ N200 + " , " + msg1 , PrivKey ( A l i c e ) ) " ) ;
22 outMB . p r i n t l n ( pubEncryption ( "authTag ,MB, " + N200 + " , " + msg1 ,
PrivKey ( A l i c e ) ) ) ;
23 /FINISH SEND MSG/
Listing 6.4: Java code for Alice in the message board example.
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1 St r ing N200 = generateNonce ( ) ;
2
3 /START SEND MSG/
4 i f ( ! ( s o ckAl i c e . isBound ( ) ) ) { sockA l i c e = makeConnection (MB, Al ice
, myPortAlice , addressOfAl ice , por tOfAl i ce ) ;
5 outAl i c e = new PrintWriter ( s ockAl i c e . getOutputStream ( ) , true ) ;
6 i nA l i c e = new BufferedReader (new InputStreamReader ( sockAl i c e .
getInputStream ( ) ) ) ;
7 }
8
9 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Sending msg to A l i c e : N200" ) ;
10 outAl i c e . p r i n t l n (N200 ) ;
11 /FINISH SEND MSG/
12
13 /START RECEIVE MSG/
14 i f ( ! ( s o ckAl i c e . isBound ( ) ) ) {
15 so ckA l i c e = makeConnection (MB, Al ice , myPortAlice ,
addressOfAl ice , por tOfAl i ce ) ;
16 outAl i c e = new PrintWriter ( s ockAl i c e . getOutputStream ( ) , true ) ;
17 i nA l i c e = new BufferedReader (new InputStreamReader ( sockAl i c e .
getInputStream ( ) ) ) ;
18 }
19
20 St r ing x133 = "" ;
21 inputLine = inA l i c e . readLine ( ) ;
22 x133=inputLine+' \n ' ;
23
24 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Received msg from Al i c e : " +x133 ) ;
25 /FINISH RECEIVE MSG/
26
27 / Star t o f message decrypt ions , comparisons , and a s s i g n s /
28 St r ing decx133 = pubDecrypt ( x133 , PubKey( A l i c e ) ) ;
29 i f ! ( decx133 . s tartsWith ( "authTag ,MB, N200" ) ) Die ( "Unmatched elements
a f t e r decrypt ion : " + x1 . sub s t r i ng (0 , x2 . l ength ) + " and " + x2 )
;
30 St r ing msg1 = decx133 . sub s t r i ng ( "authTag ,MB, N200" . l ength ( )+1) ;
31
32 /End o f message decrypt ions , comparisons , and a s s i g n s /
33 /START RECEIVE MSG/
34 i f ( ! ( sockBob . isBound ( ) ) ) {
35 sockBob = makeConnection (MB, Bob , myPortBob , addressOfBob ,
portOfBob ) ;
36 outBob = new PrintWriter ( sockBob . getOutputStream ( ) , true ) ;
37 inBob = new BufferedReader (new InputStreamReader ( sockBob .
getInputStream ( ) ) ) ;
38 }
39
40 St r ing x473 = "" ;
41 inputLine = inBob . readLine ( ) ;
42 x473=inputLine+' \n ' ;
43
44 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Received msg from Bob : " +x473 ) ;
45 /FINISH RECEIVE MSG/
46
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47 / Star t o f message decrypt ions , comparisons , and a s s i g n s /
48 St r ing decx473 = pubDecrypt ( x473 , PrivKey (MB) ) ;
49 i f ! ( decx473 . s tartsWith ( "confTag" ) ) Die ( "Unmatched elements a f t e r
decrypt ion : " + x1 . sub s t r i ng (0 , x2 . l ength ) + " and " + x2 ) ;
50 St r ing msg2 = decx473 . sub s t r i ng ( "confTag" . l ength ( )+1) ;
51
52 /End o f message decrypt ions , comparisons , and a s s i g n s /
53 /START RECEIVE MSG/
54 i f ( ! ( sockCarsten . isBound ( ) ) ) {
55 sockCarsten = makeConnection (MB, Carsten , myPortCarsten ,
addressOfCarsten , portOfCarsten ) ;
56 outCarsten = new PrintWriter ( sockCarsten . getOutputStream ( ) , true
) ;
57 inCarsten = new BufferedReader (new InputStreamReader ( sockCarsten
. getInputStream ( ) ) ) ;
58 }
59
60 St r ing x239 = "" ;
61 inputLine = inCarsten . readLine ( ) ;
62 x239=inputLine+' \n ' ;
63
64 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Received msg from Carsten : " +x239 ) ;
65 /FINISH RECEIVE MSG/
66
67 / Star t o f message decrypt ions , comparisons , and a s s i g n s /
68 St r ing decx239 = pubDecrypt ( x239 , PrivKey (MB) ) ;
69 i f ! ( decx239 . s tartsWith ( "confTag" ) ) Die ( "Unmatched elements a f t e r
decrypt ion : " + x1 . sub s t r i ng (0 , x2 . l ength ) + " and " + x2 ) ;
70 St r ing x900 = decx239 . sub s t r i ng ( "confTag" . l ength ( )+1) ;
71
72 St r ing decx900 = pubDecrypt ( x900 , PubKey( Carsten ) ) ;
73 i f ! ( decx900 . s tartsWith ( "authTag ,MB" ) ) Die ( "Unmatched elements
a f t e r decrypt ion : " + x1 . sub s t r i ng (0 , x2 . l ength ) + " and " + x2 ) ;
74 St r ing msg3 = decx900 . sub s t r i ng ( "authTag ,MB" . l ength ( )+1) ;
75
76 /End o f message decrypt ions , comparisons , and a s s i g n s /
Listing 6.5: Java code for the Message Board (MB) in the message board
example.
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Chapter 7
Tool Implementation
In this chapter, specic details regarding the implementation of the GSD frame-
work are given. Initially, the motivations behind the implementation choices
are presented in Section 7.1. In Section 7.2, the implementation of the GSD
framework is introduced and, nally, the implementation of the BAK tool is
presented in Section 7.3.
7.1 Framework choices
After the investigation of the state-of-the-art on the dierent components of the
framework presented in Chapter 2, a solution that enabled to reach the goals of
the presented research was found.
As mentioned before, the solution that was reached was based on a language
similar to the Alice and Bob notation, similar throughout the whole framework
but with some dierences between the dierent abstraction levels. Alice and
Bob notation is a simple and intuitive language when modeling communication
systems and it also makes it simple to automatically translate to AnB, which is
used by the OFMC tool and it makes it also possible to translate to the LySa
language and then be analyzed by LySatool. It is also possible to translate that
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input language into assertions that can be used with the Beliefs and Logic tools.
7.2 Implementation of the GSD Framework Pro-
totype
Having in consideration what the framework consists of, mostly parsing of the
input code, transformation of the code, which entails the interpretation and
traversal of abstract syntax trees (AST), I opted for using a functional language
for the implementation of the framework. That functional language was F#
and the prototype was developed in Visual Studio. The prototype consists of a
GUI front-end (shown in Figure 7.1) and the code that supports the GUI and
all the framework's functionalities.
Figure 7.1: The front-end of the GSD framework prototype.
The overall functioning of the framework is inspired by the method of using
ANTLR that was presented in Section 2.8.1 and can be seen in Figure 7.2.
There are several tree walkers in the tool with dierent functionalities: process
the abstract syntax tree, translate the system specication between the dierent
abstraction levels, and output code.
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Figure 7.2: Overall GSD tool process
7.2.1 Implementation of the Security Modules Contracts
in the AnB Code
In this Section, the implementation of the contracts of the security modules for
OFMC is presented. The contracts are used when generating the AnB code
that is veried by OFMC to generate the security goals of the communication
system. The contracts can therefore be implemented as a conjugation of AnB
goals as follows:
Authentication. In order to have the sent message veried for authentication,
the AnB goal states that the receiver authenticates another principal via that re-
ceived message. In fact, for the authentication module, weakly authenticates
should be used, since that goal does not require any freshness properties. There-
fore, the goal for an authenticated message msg send from X to Y is:
Auth: Y weakly authenticates X on msg
Strong Authentication This contract is similar to the authentication contract,
but with one important dierence: it requires freshness assurances, avoiding any
replay attacks. That is reected in the contract implementation shown bellow,
where X sent a strongly authenticated message to Y:
Strong Auth: Y authenticates X on msg
Condentiality. In order to achieve condentiality, the exchanged message
should be a secret between the sender and the intended receiver. In AnB syntax,
the implemented contract for a message msg sent condentially from X toY that
is modeled by having:
Conf: msg secret between X,Y
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Security. As for security, it can be seen as the composition of authentication
and condentiality. Therefore, the contract implementation in AnB for a secure
message msg sent from X toY has the following two goals:
Sec: Y weakly authenticates X on msg , msg secret between X,Y
Strong Security. This contract is similar to the one presented above, but it is
the composition of the strong authentication and the condentiality contracts.
The contract implementation in AnB for a strongly secure message msg sent
from X toY has the following two goals:
StrongSec: Y authenticates X on msg , msg secret between X,Y
7.3 Implementation of the BAK Tool
In this Section, specic details regarding the implementation of the BAK tool
are presented.
7.3.1 Implementation of the Security Modules Contracts
in the BAK Tool
In this Section, the implementation of the security modules contracts for the
BAK tool is given. The elements of these contracts are used as assertions to-
gether with the system model and the core inference rules to determine whether
the contracts hold for the chosen implementation of the security modules.
Authentication. In order to have the sent message authenticated, the receiver
of the message must believe that it was the sender who actually sent it. For
example, if X sends an authenticated message to Y, the desired outcome is the
following:
Auth: Believes(Y,Said(X,m))
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Strong Authentication This contract is similar to the authentication contract,
but with one important dierence: it not only requires that the receiver believes
that the sender sent the message, but also that the message was recently sent.
That is the dierence, in the used logic, between Said and Says. That is
reected in the contract shown bellow, where X sent a strongly authenticated
message to Y:
Strong Auth: Believes(Y,Says(X,m))
Condentiality. In order to achieve condentiality, the exchanged message
can only be seen by the rightful receiver and not seen by an attacker that might
have access to the communication. Therefore, the contract for a condential
message sent from X to Y is the following:
Conf: Sees(Y,m) ^ :(Sees(attacker,m))
Security. As for security, it can be seen as the composition of authentication
and condentiality. The receiver of the message should be entitled to believe
that the message was sent by the original sender and the receiver should also
be the only one being able to see the message itself. In fact, the beliefs that
are required for the security contract are the union of the required beliefs for
the authentication and condentiality contracts. Therefore, the contract for a
secure message sent from X to Y is the following:
Sec: Believes(Y,Said(X,m)) ^ Sees(Y,m) ^ :(Sees(attacker,m))
Strong Security. This contract is similar to the one presented above, but it is
the composition of the strong authentication and the condentiality contracts,
therefore adding freshness to the security contract is, once again, represented
by the dierence between Said and Says. The contract for a strongly secure
message from X to Y is the following:
Strong Sec: Believes(Y,Says(X,m)) ^ Sees(Y,m) ^
:(Sees(attacker,m))
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7.3.2 Implementing the Inference Rules
As an example of the implementation of the inference rules of the BAK tool
engine, we revisit one of the rules presented Section 3.1.2.2:
Sees(X;Sign(el; PrivKey(Y ))) ^ Sees(X;PubKey(Y ))
=) Sees(X; el) ^Believes(X;Said(Y; el))
The rule, in the SMT-LIB2 language, is shown in Listing 7.1. It species which
beliefs a principal can infer from a message signed with a private-key: if a princi-
pal sees an element signed with a private-key and if he knows the correspondent
public-key, then he is able to decrypt it, see the element that had been signed,
and have assurances on which principal signed the element.
Furthermore, lines 7 is also important for the implementation of the tool since
it creates a pattern that helps Z3 instantiating the variable named in line 2.
Furthermore, the name specied in the end of line 7 is used when returning the
unsatisability core. Naming this rule allows the tool to present the name when
returning an unsatisability core that contains the rule.
1 ;PRIVATE DECRYPTION
2 ( a s s e r t ( ! ( f o r a l l ( ( x P r i n c i p a l ) (w Pr i n c i pa l ) ( e l Element ) ( tag
Element ) )
3 ( ! (=> (and ( Sees x (PubKeySign tag e l ( PrivKey w) ) )
4 ( Sees x (PubKey w) ) )
5 ( and ( Sees x e l )
6 ( Be l i e v e s x ( Said w e l ) ) ) )
7 : pat tern ( ( Sees x (PubKeySign tag e l ( PrivKey w) ) ) ( Sees x (
PubKey w) ) ) ) ) : named decOfPrivKeySign ) )
Listing 7.1: One of the system rules regarding decryption.
7.3.3 Implementing the Domain restriction
Domain restriction is implemented by restricting the possible number of distinct
elements in the system. The number of elements is a potential problem because
there are functions in the system, such as concatenation and encryption, that
generate new elements from existing elements and, if this generation of new
elements is not controlled, then the system will be innitely generating new
elements, which would lead to non-termination.
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The approach taken was to implement a specic number of domain levels and
by placing a newly generated element in a domain level higher than the highest
domain level of the elements used to create that new element. This can be seen,
for example, in the concatenation rule shown in Listing 7.2. More specically,
lines 4 and 5 model the fact that only elements from the rst or second domain
are allowed to be concatenated to create another element, therefore restricting
the (otherwise innite) concatenation of elements.
1 ( a s s e r t ( f o r a l l ( ( e l 1 Element ) ( e l 2 Element ) )
2 ( ! (=> (and ( Sees a t ta cke r e l 1 )
3 ( Sees a t tacke r e l 2 )
4 ( or ( f i r s tDomain e l 1 ) ( secondDomain e l 1 ) )
5 ( or ( f i r s tDomain e l 2 ) ( secondDomain e l 2 ) ) )
6 ( Sees a t tacke r (Conc e l 1 e l 2 ) ) )
7 : pat te rn ( ( Sees a t ta cke r e l 1 ) ( Sees a t ta cke r e l 2 ) ) ) ) )
Listing 7.2: Rule for concatenation exemplifying the domain restriction
The other part of the implementation of this restriction is shown in Listing 7.3,
where the two depicted rules implement the assignment of the domain level of
the element generated by the concatenation. The domain restriction process is
similar in all the other rules present in the system that generate new elements.
1 ( a s s e r t ( f o r a l l ( ( e l 1 Element ) ( e l 2 Element ) )
2 (=> (and ( f i r s tDomain e l 1 ) ( f i r s tDomain e l 2 ) )
3 ( secondDomain (Conc e l 1 e l 2 ) ) ) ) )
4
5 ( a s s e r t ( f o r a l l ( ( e l 1 Element ) ( e l 2 Element ) )
6 (=> (and
7 ( or ( f i r s tDomain e l 1 ) ( secondDomain e l 2 ) )
8 ( or ( secondDomain e l 1 ) ( f i r s tDomain e l 2 ) )
9 ( or ( secondDomain e l 1 ) ( secondDomain e l 2 ) ) )
10 ( thirdDomain (Conc e l 1 e l 2 ) ) ) ) )
Listing 7.3: Rule for concatenation exemplifying the domain restriction
In summary, the domain in the BAK tool analysis is restricted in two ways. By
restricting the number of elements in each of the domain levels and by restricting
the number of domain levels. Both restrictions can be easily changed in the
implementations, so that one is sure that there are enough number of elements
and enough number of levels to get correct analysis results. For example, there
are currently three domain levels in the prototype implementation and, for that
reason, the system cannot reason about more than three nested concatenations.
If a system model has more than three nested concatenations, then the necessary
number of levels should be add to the system.
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7.3.4 Modeling the Represents Rule
In Section 4.2.2, the semantics of the security modules is presented and one
of the used functions introduced there is represents. This can be used, for
example, as X represents Y . This function models the fact that X has the
knowledge required to represent Y , i.e., to act as Y . A basic rule in our system
is that X represents itself and it might be able to represent another principal in
case X acquires the necessary knowledge for that.
In our prototype implementation, and since we are using a Public-Key Infras-
tructure, the represents function is modeled directly by the knowledge of a
principal's private-key. This is not the best solution to implement delegation,
however, the goal of this prototype implementation is to demonstrate how the
framework can be implemented and, therefore, the represents rule is imple-
mented in this simplied as an illustrative example. Having this in considera-
tion, the implementation of, for example, the rule for the condentiality module
shown in Section 4.2.2.3 is the following:
Z sees Conf(X;w); Z represents X
Z sees w
is given by the rule presented in Section 3.1.2.2:
Z sees Enc(w;PubKey(X)); Z sees PrivKey(X)
Z sees w
where the condentiality module is implemented with the encryption with the
public-key of Y and Z represents X is modeled by the fact that Z sees X's
private-key.
Chapter 8
Use Case: Verifying ADS-B
Communication System
The main goal of this use case is to model and analyze the ADS-B airspace
navigation system [QR]. The research performed in this chapter was performed
in my External Stay at NASA Ames Research Center in collaboration with
Kristin Y. Rozier.
ADS-B stands for Automatic Dependent-Surveillance Broadcast and is a new
airspace navigation system being deployed with the goal of complementing (and
eventually subsume) the current airspace navigation system (i.e. the radar). Its
main advantage in relation to the radar is its ability to provide a more accurate
aircraft location information. ADS-B will, therefore, play a crucial role in world-
wide aviation and, in particular, international commercial aviation. The system
is presented in more detail in Section 8.1.
Due to the crucial role it is going to play, we believe it is natural to study its secu-
rity properties. In fact, we are not the rst ones to believe that: McCallie iden-
tied dierent ADS-B attack taxonomies [MBM11] that we discuss and model
in Section 8.3.2.1 and Valovage et al. made several contributions on extending
ADS-B by suggesting dierent ways of making it more secure [Val06, VV+07].
His suggestions did have some issues, and part of the work presented here aims
at solving those issues and at providing suggestions for further improvement of
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the system. Valovage's extensions are presented and discussed in Section 8.3.3
and our suggestions are presented in Section 8.4.
We used the GSD framework to model and verify the current ADS-B commu-
nication system. Having the formal results of the framework showing us how
insecure the ADS-B communication system is by itself gave us more condence
for the modeling and analysis of the dierent attack scenarios and those even-
tually lead us to investigate and successfully verify possible security extensions
of ADS-B.
It is worth mentioning that the scope of this analysis is limited to ADS-B and not
to the airspace system as a whole. ADS-B is a new airspace navigation system,
but it is a part of a much larger system that is used to control the airspace.
Therefore, the analysis results presented here do not reect the security of the
whole airspace system but of ADS-B by itself.
8.1 ADS-B
As mentioned above, ADS-B [FAAa, RTC02] is an air trac management surveil-
lance system that is a crucial part of NextGen [FAAb]. As depicted in Figure 8.1,
ADS-B is a large wireless network, composed by ground stations and aircraft
that communicate with each other  the aircraft report ight information (such
as their position, velocity, and intent) and receive trac and other information
from the ground stations  in a way that enhances the "see and avoid" capa-
bility of the aircraft. In fact, the main benet of ADS-B is the provided higher
accuracy regarding the aircraft position, which is crucial in an airspace that is
increasingly more crowded with aircraft.
Figure 8.1: Overview of the ADS-B system
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ADS-B has two main components: ADS-B Out and ADS-B In. ADS-B Out 
the broadcast of the aircraft's information  will be mandatory in the American
National Airspace System (NAS) by 2020. ADS-B In  the reception of the
information sent by the base stations and also the reception of ADS-B Out
broadcasted by other aircraft  is currently being studied and it is still not
clear when, or even if, it will be mandatory.
There is no doubt that ADS-B will have a crucial role in the aircraft navigation
in the NAS and, for that reason, it is essential that it is formally veried before
its nal adoption. One potential vulnerability of the system is the lack of built-
in security in its communications. In fact, it currently relies on current systems
(such as the radar) to achieve the security guarantees. We believe that this
approach is not the ideal design approach and that it is potentially dangerous
to deploy a new system that has to rely on current systems to fully function.
Therefore, we believe that it is important to verify the security properties of
ADS-B by itself, i.e.; who is able to send and receive the dierent exchanged
messages. For example, are the exchanged messages authenticated? I.e., is an
attacker able to send information to an aircraft, impersonating a base station?
Are the messages condential? I.e., as an attacker able to read the information
broadcasted by the aircraft and therefore have access to the exact location of
the aircraft. The argument is not whether (or when) authentication and/or
condentiality are in fact needed in ADS-B. The goal of this use case is to
interpret the results of the formal analysis of the dierent security aspects of
ADS-B and its suggested extensions.
8.1.1 ADS-B's Communication System
The legitimate principals taking part in the ADS-B's communication system are
the aircraft and the ground-station. As previously mentioned, ADS-B has two
components that allow the principals to communicate: ADS-B Out and ADS-B
In.
ADS-B Out consists of the messages that are broadcasted by the aircraft. A
message contains the aircraft's position and speed (both acquired through a
positioning system, presently GPS) and potentially other information, such as
intent. These broadcasted messages are received by the ground-stations and, in
case ADS-B In is being used, the former will also be received by the aircraft
that are within range of the broadcaster aircraft.
ADS-B In concerns the capability of receiving the ADS-B Out messages. As
explained above, an aircraft is only able to receive air to air ADS-B messages
broadcasted from other aircraft if it has ADS-B In capabilities. Another part of
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ADS-B In is the information broadcasted by the ground-stations. This consists
of trac and weather information. During the transitional phase, the trac
information will have a mixture of ADS-B and Radar information, enabling the
ADS-B In equipped aircraft to have a full view of the airspace surrounding it.
In the U.S., ADS-B can be used in two dierent data-links: the 1090MHz Ex-
tended Squitter and the Universal Access Transceiver (UAT).
8.1.1.1 1090MHz Extended Squitter
ADS-B can be used in this medium by using the Mode S transponder with
Extended (112 bit) Squitter and aircraft ying above 18000 feet are obliged to
used this medium. It is worth noting that this is the only allowed technology
for ADS-B communication in the rest of the world.
An ADS-B message in this format has 112bits of which 8 bits are reserved
for control codes (such as message type and sub-type), 24 bits for the aircraft
(ICAO) address, 56 bits for ADS-B data and, nally, 24 bits for Forward Error
Correction (FEC), which is able to detect and correct a limited number of errors
without the need to re-transmitting the data.
Position and Velocity data is sent in dierent messages based on the given type
codes [RTC11a, table 2-14]. For an airborne position message, altitude is 12 bits
in either 100 or 25 foot increments, depending on the chosen setting. Longitude
and latitude are 17 bits each in Compact Position Reporting (CPR) encoded
format [RTC11a, appendix T]. This format was specically developed for ADS-
B messages broadcast on this data-link with the goal of reducing the number of
bits required in the transmission of the longitude and latitude coordinates. The
velocity message is a map between integer range from 1 to 1023 and a range of
speeds in knots depending on whether the aircraft is traveling on the ground,
subsonic, or supersonic. It can be either in E-W and N-S vector components
plus vertical rate or in a Heading, Airspeed, and Vertical Rate format [RTC11a,
tables A-1, A-5, A-6].
8.1.1.2 Universal Access Transceiver
This data-link (978MHz) can only be used for ADS-B broadcast in the NAS
and by small, non-commercial aircraft that y bellow 18000 feet. The American
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) decided to also allow ADS-B to be used
in this medium because it makes it not only cheaper but also easier to start
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using ADS-B since no new hardware has to be installed in most of the small
aircraft ying today. This decision will, however, also result in a more complex
system, since aircraft using dierent data-link technologies will not be able to
communication directly using ADS-B and will only receive each other's ADS-B
messages via the ADS-R broadcasts (see Section 8.1.1.3).
There are two basic types of broadcast messages on the UAT channel: the ADS-
B Message, and the Ground Uplink Message [RTC11b, page 24]. The ADS-B
Message is broadcasted by an aircraft to share its position, velocity and other
information while the Ground Uplink Message is used by ground stations to
up-link ight information to any aircraft that is within its reach. An ADS-B
Message in the UAT link has two main components, one that contains user
information and another used for forward error correction code parity, that
supports the correction of a limited number of errors on the transfer of the
data. To achieve this FEC code parity, Reed-Solomon blocks [RS60] are used
in the UAT link. This technique uses nite eld arithmetic and its widespread
use goes from the CD player to communication systems, including spacecraft
communications [Wic94].
The aforementioned messages contain a payload/application data of 144 bits
(Basic ADS-B Message) or 272 bits (Long ADS-B Message) [RTC11b, page 24].
The Ground Uplink Message can have up to 3455bits of payload data, of which
64bits are reserved for a UAT Specic Header and the remaining 3392bits can
be used for application data [RTC11b, page 26]. 1
8.1.1.3 ADS-R
ADS-R stands for Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Rebroadcast and its
purpose is to translate the ADS-B messages from one technology to the other.
That is, if an ADS-R station receives an ADS-B broadcast in the 1090MHz
frequency, it will reformat it and broadcast it in the 978MHz frequency (UAT)
and vice-versa. This service was created to mitigate the incompatibility of the
ADS-B messages being broadcasted in the two dierent frequencies.
8.1.1.4 ADS-C
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Contract (ADS-C, but sometimes also called
ADS-A) is identical to ADS-B, but as opposed to ADS-B, the information
1The number of bits available for the Ground Uplink Message diers from that in Valovage's
work [Val06]; it is from [RTC11b], which was published 5 years later.
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reaches the ground stations using Satellite communication, i.e., the Mode S
Transponder transmits the information via a Satcom, which is then relayed to
the ground stations. ADS-C could, therefore, be the main method of commu-
nication in areas outside the range of the any ground stations, such as large
bodies of water [Avi12].
8.2 Using the GSD framework
The usage of GSD framework for modeling and analyzing ADS-B and its poten-
tial extensions is shown in Figure 8.2. The most abstract level of the framework
(Abstract Global) was not used, since that level is more targeted for developing
secure systems and not so much for modeling and analyzing systems previously
developed. This happens because the Abstract Global level's strength is the
usage of the dierent security modules, which are useful when developing a sys-
tem from scratch and we want to express the desired security properties of the
data in the messages. The Concrete Endpoint level was not used either, since
we were not focusing on the analysis and code output performed at that level.
The analysis was performed using the BAK tool 3 since it is the most exible
tool of the ones used by the GSD framework and we were, therefore, able to
tailor that analysis to the system being analyzed.
For these reasons, we used the ADS-B system model as input to the Concrete
Global level. This model is automatically translated into a language that can
be used by the BAK tool to verify the system and its properties (or goals) as
detailed in Section 3.2.
One necessary change in the inference rules of the BAK tool had to be performed
regarding the way the sending of messages is processed. In ADS-B, a principal
broadcasts the messages instead of sending them directly to another principal
and that is reected in the adapted model of the system, where the messages
are specied as being sent to a specic principal (Air) in order to model their
broadcast. Therefore, the rule was changed to:
MsgSent(X,Air,el) =) Sees(P,el)
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Figure 8.2: The GSD Framework applied to ADS-B
8.3 Modeling and Verifying ADS-B and its ex-
tensions
By modeling ADS-B's communication system in the GSD framework, we specify
the system in a language that is more formal than the written English used by
the system designers and more abstract than the specication languages that
are used as input to the dierent verication tools. That helps closing the gap
between the two and makes it easier to provide feedback to the system designers.
This way, it enables not only the formal verication of the ADS-B system but
also makes it easier to report the results to the system designers.
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8.3.1 Modeling ADS-B
We started by reviewing the existing American ADS-B standards [RTC02, RTC11a,
RTC11b] and other documents that describe ADS-B [FAAa, Avi12] in order to
identify ADS-B's communication protocol. A simple overview of the identied
system is shown in Figure 8.3.
Figure 8.3: Overview of the ADS-B model
The ADS-B system is composed by three principal types: the aircraft, the
ground stations and the satellites. We made some abstractions in our model
that are worth mentioning. We abstracted the details regarding the data be-
ing transmitted in the ADS-B broadcasts and we also abstracted the way the
aircraft acquire their position and speed by having a principal called Satellite
sending that information to the aircraft. These are abstractions that make the
modeling simpler but that still allow the analysis that we want to perform. Be-
sides those messages, we also modeled the ADS-B broadcasts made both by the
ground stations and the aircraft.
As mentioned above, we modeled the broadcast of messages buy specifying that
a principal sends a message to Air. This way of modeling the system, together
with the BAK tool allow us to easily model Denial of Service and also, using
the modular attacker capabilities of the BAK tools, when a principal is out of
reach.
We were mostly interested in analyzing the security properties of the exchanged
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messages and to reason about that, it was enough to model a small part of the
system when each of the principals are sending one message. That system model
can be seen in Listing 8.1.
S a t e l l i t e ! A1 : S a t e l l i t e , po s i t i on1 , speed1 ;
S a t e l l i t e ! A2 : S a t e l l i t e , po s i t i on2 , speed2 ;
A1 ! Air : A1 , pos i t i on1 , speed1 , i n t en t1 ;
A2 ! Air : A2 , pos i t i on2 , speed2 , i n t en t2 ;
GS ! Air : GS, t r a f f i c I n f o , weather In fo ;
Listing 8.1: ADS-B Model
8.3.2 Validation of the ADS-B Model
There were mainly two processes we used to to perform the validation of our
model. We presented our model to the experts at NASA and discussed it with
them, analyzing their feedback and we also modeled and veried McCallie's
attack taxonomies and compared the results with the descriptions given by
McCallie [MBM11]. This verication is presented bellow.
8.3.2.1 McCallie's attack taxonomies
McCallie [MBM11] identies dierent ADS-B attack taxonomies that we believe
are important to consider when performing the validation of our model of the
ADS-B communication system. All these attacks were successfully veried with
BAK tool against the modeled ADS-B communication system. The dierent
attacks are:
Aircraft Reconnaissance
This attack consists on intercepting and decoding ADS-B transmissions by ex-
ploring its lack of condentiality. This enables any outsider with an ADS-B
enable receiver to acquire the transmitted ight information, such as the air-
craft's ID, together with its position, speed and intent.
This attack consists on intercepting and decoding ADS-B transmissions. And,
since it is a passive attack, it can just be modeled by testing if the attacker is
able to see the speed and location information sent by the aircraft. That can be
done with a goal such as attacker sees position1, where position1 is the
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position broadcasted by one of the aircraft.
Ground Station Flood Denial
This attack will disrupt transmission at the ground station, preventing it from
receiving the ADS-B transmissions from the aircraft. This can be done by using
a jamming device next to the ground station.
This attack will disrupt transmission at the ground station and is, therefore, an
active attack, more complex to model. One way this attack can be interpreted
is that, if an interference successfully jams a ground station, then it is changing
the topology of our network model. This can then be modeled by changing the
way messages are exchanged in the system, i.e., when the aircraft broadcast
their information, the ground station being jammed will not see those messages.
In our model, that is done by changing one of the core rules. The original rule
expresses that if a message is sent to Air, the former is seen by every principal
in the system. By changing the rule so that the jammed ground station does not
see the messages sent to Air, then we are modeling the outcomes of a successful
jamming attack on that ground station.
Ground Station Target Ghost Inject
This attack explores the lack of secure authentication mechanisms by injecting
an ADS-B signal into a ground station with the intent of leading the ground
station to believe that a fake aircraft is in the airspace.
The importance of this attack is dismissed by FAA by saying that the integration
with a secondary navigation system, such as the radar, will identify these ghost
aircraft. FAA is, therefore, arguing for the security of ADS-B using its not so
well dened integration of ADS-B with other navigation systems. We believe it
would be more desirable to have this security embedded in ADS-B to start with.
This active attack injects an ADS-B signal into a ground station and is modeled
by having the attacker broadcast false information regarding the position and
speed of an aircraft.
Aircraft Flood Denial
This is similar to the ground station ood denial attack, except that the target
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is an aircraft. This attack is harder to perform, when compared to the ground
station ood denial, specially when the aircraft is airborne. A situation where
this attack would be more feasible is next to airport, where aircraft are taking
o and landing.
This is similar to the ground station ood denial attack and is modeled in a
similar fashion. The dierence being, in this case, that the aircraft is the one
who is not able to see the messages broadcasted by the other principals.
Aircraft Target Ghost Inject
Similar to the ground station target ghost inject attack, except that the target is
an aircraft. This makes the attack potentially more dangerous since the aircraft
will not be able to directly check the received position of the ghost aircraft. This
can, at least, cause momentary panic with the pilots who might think that the
ghost aircraft is dangerously close to their aircraft.
This attack is modeled in the same way the ground station target ghost inject
attack is modeled. That is because whenever an attacker broadcasts the false
information of the ghost aircraft, it will also be received by the aircraft that are
in receiving range.
Ground Station Multiple Ghost Inject
This attack injects several ADS-B signals into a ground station. It is similar to
the ground station target ghost inject attack, except that multiple targets are
injected into the system. This can be used to overwhelm the surveillance system
and create confusion and eventually make the user lose trust in the system.
This active attack injects several ADS-B signals into a ground station and is
modeled by using several messages similar to the one modeled in Ground Sta-
tion Target Ghost Inject.
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8.3.3 Valovage's ADS-B Security Extensions
Valovage et al. have been working on extending ADS-B with mechanisms
that enable authentication and/or condentiality of the ADS-B broadcast mes-
sages [Val06, VV+07].
Valovage's suggestion uses secret keys shared between the principals present in
the system (ideally there are dierent keys for each pair of principals). These
keys, used together with Hashing and MAC, functions enable the authentication
of the principals while adding a small number of extra necessary bits. As for
condentiality, Valovage also suggests the use of shared-key cryptography, but
performing data encryption in order to achieve condentiality, which will will
require more extra bits.
A positive aspect of his approach is that it is retro compatible, i.e., compatible
with the present implementation, when just using the extra authentication. It
is not possible to be retro compatible when using encryption to achieve con-
dentiality, since in this case no information in plain-text is sent and, therefore,
only the principals using this scheme and with access to the shared-keys will be
able to decrypt the sent message.
In the suggested solution, present in the patent [VV+07] and shown in Table 8.1,
dierent combinations of authentication and condentiality are proposed. Fur-
thermore, Valovage also presents options that provide strong authentication by
having freshness guarantees present when performing the authentication, which
as we previously discussed prevents replay attacks. All these solutions were
successfully veried with the GSD framework using the BAK tool.
Condentiality/ No Yes Yes
Authentication (and Fresh)
No Current ADS-B Section 8.3.3.1 Section 8.3.3.3
Yes  Section 8.3.3.2 Section 8.3.3.4
Table 8.1: Dierent options on Valovage's suggested ADS-B extension
8.3.3.1 ADS-B with Authentication
This is shown in Fig. 2 of the patent. The principal that is being authenticated
sends not only the normal ADS-B information but also some extra bits that
result from applying the MAC function to the Hash of a default value, the
principal's Id, the ADS-B data and a secret key that is shared between the
principal and the intended message recipient. This way, when the intended
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recipient receives this extra bits, together with the data sent in plain-text, he
is able to authenticate the data. This can be done because the principal that
receives the messages has all the data (the default number, the other principal's
Id, the sent ADS-B data and the secret key) and, therefore, is able to feed them
into the Hash and MAC functions and compare the resulting bits with the extra
ones received in the ADS-B message. The modeled message exchange is shown
in Listing 8.2.
A1  > GS: Hash&Mac( de fau l t ,
Id (A1) ,
adsbData ,
ShKey(GS, A1) ) ,
Id (A1) ,
adsbData
Listing 8.2: ABS-B with Authentication
One thing worth noticing is that this solution does not provide any guarantees
of freshness to the principal receiving the message, so it is subject to replay
attacks and it is not, therefore, suitable for using in very secure sensitive areas.
However, it is a very lightweight solution that adds some security to ADS-B
and that could be used when some message authentication is required, but no
high concerns regarding potential replay attacks are present. Furthermore, any
principal external to the system is still able to read the information sent in
plain-text, i.e., the Id of the principal together with the ADS-B data.
8.3.3.2 ADS-B with Authentication and Condentiality
This extension, shown in Fig. 3 of the patent, is similar to the one presented
in the previous section, but both the Id of the principal and the ADS-B data
are being encrypted with the secret key prior to being sent and also prior to
being fed into the Hash function. This requires the principal receiving the
principal to decrypt the data with the secret key. This extends the previous
suggestion with condentiality, which prevents any outside principal to read the
sent information. This solution is modeled as shown in Listing 8.3.
A1  > GS: Hash&Mac( de fau l t ,
Enc ( ( Id (A1) , data ) , ShKey(GS,A1) ) ,
ShKey(GS, A1) ) ,
Enc ( Id (A1) , data , ShKey(GS,A1) )
Listing 8.3: ABS-B with Authentication and Condentiality
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8.3.3.3 ADS-B with Fresh Authentication
This proposed extension of ADS-B not only provides authentication to the prin-
cipal sending the ADS-B message but also fresh authentication, which will pro-
tect the system against the possibility of replay attacks. This, as one could
expect, comes at a price, in this case network bandwidth. Similarly to the
implementation of the strong authentication shown in Section 4.2.2, Valovage
implements freshness by having the authenticator  in the ADS-B's case, the
Ground Station  broadcasting a fresh challenge that will be used by the prin-
cipal being authenticating. When performing the hashing of the dierent values,
the principal also uses the broadcasted fresh challenge. This way, the Ground
Station has guarantees that the information was recently broadcasted by the
authenticated principal. Using this mode will still be backwards compatible.
The model for this extension is shown in Listing 8.4.
GS  > A1 : nonce
A1  > GS: Hash&Mac( nonce ,
Id (A1) ,
adsbData ,
ShKey(GS,A1) ) ,
Id (A1) ,
adsbData
Listing 8.4: ABS-B with Fresh Authentication
8.3.3.4 ADS-B with Fresh Authentication and Condentiality
This extends the previous suggestion with condentiality. It is the most se-
cure of the suggested extensions to ADS-B since it provides authentication with
freshness guarantees together with condentiality, which is, in fact, the security
properties given by the strong security module present in the Abstract Global
level of the GSD framework. This extension's model is presented in Listing 8.5.
GS  > A1 : nonce
A1  > GS: Hash&Mac( nonce ,
Enc ( ( Id (A1) , adsbData ) , shKey (GS,A1) ) ,
ShKey(GS,A1) ) ,
Enc ( ( Id (A1) , adsbData ) , ShKey(GS,A1) )
Listing 8.5: ABS-B with Fresh Authentication and Condentiality
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8.4 Suggested extensions to ADS-B
In this section, we present some ideas on how to further extend ADS-B with
security capabilities. The goal of this section is, therefore, to show a range of
dierent security mechanisms that can be used. Each have dierent pros and
cons and the choice should be made by having those in consideration.
The biggest challenge regarding these suggested extensions is the key-management.
Some ideas are given on how to perform it, but further work needs to be done
in order to arrive at an optimal solution.
8.4.1 Shared Key Cryptography - key per airspace
In this approach, a shared-key would be used for authentication and conden-
tiality within an airspace, which could be a country, or a state, or the oceanic
airspace. This means that all the aircraft that y through a specic airspace
will have the respective shared-key. The distribution of that key could be done
when the aircraft is getting authorized for take o. Since its route has to be
authorized, it could also receive (securely) from the Ground System the shared-
keys of the dierent airspaces that the aircraft is ying through. Then, when
ying in one airspace, it would use the respective shared key when the need for
authentication and/or condentiality arises by, respectively, using the shared
key in the hash function or encrypting the message with the shared key, as
suggested by Valovage et al.
This approach requires trusting in a big number of principals and it would only
provide a certain degree of authentication and/or condentiality, i.e., using this
system, an authorized principal would be able to be authenticated and read a
condential message sent from another authorized principal in that airspace, but
the level of assurance that the message was sent from a specic aircraft is not
as high as when compared with the suggestion bellow. This is the case because
a high number of principals will have access to the shared-key. We would argue
that, despite that, it would still provide ADS-B with a better security level than
the present one, since it makes it impossible for a non-authorized principal to
authenticate or read condential ADS-B messages, assuming the shared-key is
leaked.
It would, however, be fairly complicate to manage all the keys, specially in case
one them is leaked. If a non-authorized principal has access to a shared-key, the
ground system would have to broadcast a key update for that airspace  via
ADS-B or eventually ADS-C, in case it is an oceanic airspace  but it is hard
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to provide guarantees that all the aircraft will have the updated key before the
non-authorized principal can explore its knowledge of the leaked shared-key.
8.4.2 Public Keys Cryptography
In this suggestion, a Public-Key Infrastructure would be used to extend ADS-B
with higher security assurances. Each aircraft has a public-/private-key pair
and the ground system also has a public-/private-key pair.
Regarding the aircraft key pair, as it is common in a PKI, only the aircraft
know their own private-key of its pair while the public-key is accessible to all
the principals in the system. The ground system would act as the PKI certicate
authority (CA) by maintaining a database of all the aircraft public-keys and in
case an aircraft needs a public-key to authenticate or read a condential message
that it received, it can send a request to the ground system, which will then
transmit the required public-key signed with its own private key. This request
and reply can either happen via ADS-B in case a ADS-B ground stations is
within of the aircraft, or if that is not the case (which will not happen that
often) the request can be made via satellite, for example using ADS-C. The
satellite communication (which ADS-C uses) is not to be used often, but we
believe that most of the times there will be an ADS-B station within reach and,
therefore, ADS-B can be used.
This system enables both authentication and condentiality. The former by
encrypting an hash of the ADS-B message with ones private-key and the latter
by encrypting the whole message with the intended recipient's public-key. We
are aware that using condentiality for air-to-air communication in an area
with a high density of aircraft will not be simple with this suggestion, since
one would have to encrypt and send the message as many times as the number
of aircraft within reach. If condentiality becomes really important, it could
be advantageous to consider an hybrid solution, with a public-key system for
authentication and a shared-key system similar to the one presented in the
previous section for condentiality.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
The only truly secure system is one that is
powered o, cast in a block of concrete, and sealed
in a lead-lined room with armed guards.
Eugene Spaord
In today's interconnected world, it is frequently impossible to adopt the solu-
tion mentioned by Eugene Spaord and that is why it is so important to build
communication systems that are secure. In this thesis, I presented a framework
that targets precisely that. The Guided System Development (GSD) framework
aims at helping the modeling, verication, and implementation of secure com-
munication systems. The framework is composed by three dierent abstraction
levels: the Abstract Global (Chapter 4), the Concrete Global (Chapter 5), and
the Concrete Endpoint (Chapter 6). The specication of the communication
system is modeled in the Abstract Global level and step-wise is used to trans-
late that specication to the other levels of the tool: from the Abstract Global
level to the Concrete Global level by replacing the security modules with their
implementation and from the Concrete Global level to the Concrete Endpoint
level by performing an endpoint projection of the specication, transforming it
from a global view of the communication system into an endpoint view of the
same communication system.
The modeling of the communication system is performed with a simple and intu-
itive language that has the necessary constructs (security modules) for modeling
the security requirements of the exchanged messages. This modeling phase is
the main focus of the Abstract Global level of the framework.
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One of the main values of the GSD framework is the connection with dierent
tools that used formal methods to perform security verication of communica-
tion systems. Having the connection to these dierent tools allows for an ex-
tensive analysis of the communication system and its security properties. Each
verication tools has its strong points and connecting to a number of tools
allows for a more extensive analysis of the modeled system. The developed
GSD framework prototype connects to OFMC, LySatool, and the BAK tool,
which was developed as part of this work specically for the GSD framework
and is presented in Chapter 3. The connection to LySatool is performed from
the Concrete Endpoint level and is presented in Section 6.4.1, while the con-
nection to OFMC is performed both in the Abstract Global level and in the
Concrete Global level, presented in Section 4.3.1 and Section 5.3.2, respectively.
The GSD framework prototype also provides the automatic translation of the
communication skeleton for each of the modeled principals to Java code.
9.1 Future Work
In this Section, I discuss future work possibilities regarding both the research
side of my work and also the side more related with the prototype development.
There are some interesting possibilities in terms of future work related with
the research presented here: one possibility would be to extend the Abstract
Global level with more security modules that would provide dierent communi-
cation properties, such as non-repudiation and message ordering, and also dene
their implementation. Another interesting possibility would be to enable the de-
scription of receiver actions in the Abstract Global level specication using, for
example, extra notations. One could also further explore the analysis of sce-
narios where the modular attacker property of the BAK tool is required, which
would happen, for example, in real cyber-physical systems where the attacker
is limited geographically. Another possibility would be to add the connection
to other verication tools: for example, some that provide quantitative secu-
rity analysis. Another interesting research direction would be to provide more
assurances regarding the generated code, this could either be done by formally
proving the correctness of the translation from a veried model or by extracting
a veriable specication from the generated code. Finally, other use cases of the
application of the GSD framework could also be studied.
There are some details on the prototype implementation of the GSD framework
that were not nalized due to them being predominantly engineering problems
and my main goal was to focus on the research possibilities of this work. Having
said that, if one wants to improve the prototype tool, there are a number of de-
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tails one could focus on. The BAK tool could be extended in order to enable the
analysis and interpretation of the satisability model given as output  when
the analysis result is SAT  in order to provide more useful feedback to the sys-
tem designer. Regarding the translation to AnB code, more information could
automatically generated, such as the initial knowledge for the principals and the
modeled dummy messages in between the modeled messages. Furthermore, one
could also explore the OFMC analysis with dishonest principals, which could
be interesting for the authentication cases. There are also some possibilities re-
garding the translation to LySa and the fact that the missing information could
be automatically generated: one piece of missing information in the translation
is the description of the cryptopoints  which are explained in Section 6.4.1
 and the other would be the declaration of the sent messages as new, i.e.,
modeling that they are created by the sender so that the condentiality analysis
result is correct. Regarding the translation to Java: more information could be
extracted, but more importantly, the translation could be improved to gener-
ate fully compilable Java programs instead of the communication skeletons that
are generated in the current prototype implementation. Finally, one should
also consider adding more plugins to the GSD framework and, therefore, more
possible implementations of the security modules.
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Appendix A
Code
A.1 Java Library
Some of the functions dened in the used Java Library are shown below.
public stat ic St r ing generateNonce ( ) {
St r ing r e s u l t = null ;
SecureRandom random ;
try {
random = SecureRandom . ge t In s tance ( "SHA1PRNG" ) ;
byte nonce [ ] = new byte [ 2 0 ] ;
random . nextBytes ( nonce ) ; // compute a 20 byte random nonce
r e s u l t = new St r ing ( nonce ) ;
} catch ( NoSuchAlgorithmException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
}
return r e s u l t ;
}
Listing A.1: Generate unique string.
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stat ic St r ing pubEncryption ( St r ing msg , S t r ing key ) {
St r ing r e s u l t = new St r ing ( ) ;
try {
Fi le InputStream k e y f i s = new Fi leInputStream ( "keys /" + key + " .
pubkey" ) ;
byte [ ] encKey = new byte [ k e y f i s . a v a i l a b l e ( ) ] ;
k e y f i s . read ( encKey ) ;
k e y f i s . c l o s e ( ) ;
X509EncodedKeySpec pubKeySpec = new X509EncodedKeySpec ( encKey ) ;
KeyFactory keyFactory = KeyFactory . g e t In s tance ( "RSA" ) ;
PublicKey pubKey = keyFactory . gene ra tePub l i c ( pubKeySpec ) ;
// I n s t a n t i a t e the c iphe r
Cipher c iphe r = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( "RSA" ) ;
c iphe r . i n i t ( Cipher .ENCRYPT_MODE, pubKey) ;
byte [ ] encrypted = c iphe r . doFinal (msg . getBytes ( ) ) ;
// conver t s to base64
r e s u l t = new St r ing ( Base64 . encodeBase64 ( encrypted ) ) ;
} catch ( IOException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( NoSuchAlgorithmException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( NoSuchPaddingException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( Inval idKeyExcept ion e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( I l l e g a lB l o c kS i z eExc ep t i on e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( BadPaddingException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( Inval idKeySpecException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
}
return r e s u l t ;
}
Listing A.2: Public-Key Encryption.
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stat ic St r ing pubDecryption ( St r ing msg , S t r ing key ) {
St r ing r e s u l t = new St r ing ( ) ;
try {
Fi le InputStream k e y f i s = new Fi leInputStream ( "keys /" + key + " .
pr ivkey " ) ;
byte [ ] encKey = new byte [ k e y f i s . a v a i l a b l e ( ) ] ;
k e y f i s . read ( encKey ) ;
k e y f i s . c l o s e ( ) ;
PKCS8EncodedKeySpec privKeySpec = new PKCS8EncodedKeySpec (
encKey ) ;
KeyFactory keyFactory = KeyFactory . g e t In s tance ( "RSA" ) ;
PrivateKey privKey = keyFactory . g ene ra t ePr iva t e ( privKeySpec ) ;
// I n s t a n t i a t e the c iphe r
Cipher c iphe r = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( "RSA" ) ;
c iphe r . i n i t ( Cipher .DECRYPT_MODE, privKey ) ;
// decode message
byte [ ] decodedText = Base64 . decodeBase64 (msg . getBytes ( ) ) ;
byte [ ] o r i g i n a l = c iphe r . doFinal ( decodedText ) ;
r e s u l t = new St r ing ( o r i g i n a l ) ;
} catch ( IOException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( NoSuchAlgorithmException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( NoSuchPaddingException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( Inval idKeyExcept ion e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( I l l e g a lB l o c kS i z eExc ep t i on e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( BadPaddingException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( Inval idKeySpecException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
}
return r e s u l t ;
}
Listing A.3: Public-Key Decryption.
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stat ic St r ing shEncryption ( St r ing msg , Arg key ) {
byte [ ] raw = null ;
S t r ing r e s u l t = new St r ing ( ) ;
i f ( key . getData ( ) . l ength ( ) < 10) {
try {
Fi leInputStream k e y f i s = new Fi leInputStream ( "keys /" + ( key .
getData ( ) ) + " . shkey" ) ;
raw = new byte [ k e y f i s . a v a i l a b l e ( ) ] ;
k e y f i s . read ( raw ) ;
k e y f i s . c l o s e ( ) ;
} catch ( IOException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
}
}
else {
raw = Base64 . decodeBase64 ( key . getData ( ) . getBytes ( ) ) ;
}
try{
SecretKeySpec skeySpec = new SecretKeySpec ( raw , "AES" ) ;
// I n s t a n t i a t e the c iphe r
Cipher c iphe r = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( "AES" ) ;
c iphe r . i n i t ( Cipher .ENCRYPT_MODE, skeySpec ) ;
byte [ ] encrypted = c iphe r . doFinal (msg . getBytes ( ) ) ;
// conver t s to base64
r e s u l t = new St r ing ( Base64 . encodeBase64 ( encrypted ) ) ;
} catch ( NoSuchAlgorithmException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( NoSuchPaddingException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( Inval idKeyExcept ion e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( I l l e g a lB l o c kS i z eExc ep t i on e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( BadPaddingException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
}
return r e s u l t ;
}
Listing A.4: Shared-Key Encryption.
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stat ic St r ing shDecryption ( St r ing msg , Arg key ) {
byte [ ] raw = null ;
S t r ing r e s u l t = new St r ing ( ) ;
i f ( key . getData ( ) . l ength ( ) < 10) {
try {
Fi leInputStream k e y f i s = new Fi leInputStream ( "keys /" + ( key .
getData ( ) ) + " . shkey" ) ;
raw = new byte [ k e y f i s . a v a i l a b l e ( ) ] ;
k e y f i s . read ( raw ) ;
k e y f i s . c l o s e ( ) ;
} catch ( IOException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
}
}
else {
raw = Base64 . decodeBase64 ( key . getData ( ) . getBytes ( ) ) ;
}
try{
SecretKeySpec skeySpec = new SecretKeySpec ( raw , "AES" ) ;
// I n s t a n t i a t e the c iphe r
Cipher c iphe r = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( "AES" ) ;
c iphe r . i n i t ( Cipher .DECRYPT_MODE, skeySpec ) ;
// decode message
byte [ ] decodedText = Base64 . decodeBase64 (msg . getBytes ( ) ) ;
byte [ ] o r i g i n a l = c iphe r . doFinal ( decodedText ) ;
r e s u l t = new St r ing ( o r i g i n a l ) ;
} catch ( NoSuchAlgorithmException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( NoSuchPaddingException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( Inval idKeyExcept ion e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( I l l e g a lB l o c kS i z eExc ep t i on e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
} catch ( BadPaddingException e ) {
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
}
return r e s u l t ;
}
Listing A.5: Shared-Key Decryption.
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